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ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE’S CASUALTIES: 
DEFENDING VICTIM-WITNESS 
PROTECTION 
MARY FAN* 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court and some state courts have constitutional-
ized an increasingly rigid and broad vision of adversarial adjudication’s re-
quirements. Commentators often celebrate this adversarial revolution as ex-
panding defendants’ rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and self-
representation. Yet the adversarial revolution also has created an arsenal of 
tactics to retraumatize victims of sexual assault and general violent crime. The 
courts and legislatures are in disarray about what to do to protect vulnerable 
victim-witnesses. This Article is about adversarial adjudication’s casualties 
and how to reduce the risk of harm. The Article defends a subset of protective 
measures that avert further injury to victims while remaining sensitive to de-
fendants’ rights. The Article also challenges the rigid application of adversari-
al ideals historically forged for adjudicating crimes against the sovereign, such 
as seditious libel, to crimes of sex and violence involving victims. A distinc-
tion must be made between the core category of crimes against the state, 
where protections are at their zenith because the victim and prosecution are 
identical and powerful, and crimes outside this paradigm, where restrictions 
should be less rigid. Recognizing this important difference clears some of the 
murk and doubt that chills protective measures for victim-witnesses who have 
experienced traumatic injury. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is among a minority of nations in the world with an 
adversarial criminal justice system.1 The model gives partisan-lawyers the 
dominant role in selecting and challenging evidence through confrontation 
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 1 Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial 
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 257 (2006); Gerard E. 
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2124 (1998); 
Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 
301 (1989). 
776 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:775 
of witnesses, cross-examination, and pretrial discovery to elicit information 
from opponents.2 Over the last decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has en-
larged confrontation, cross-examination, and self-representation rights. 3 
State courts may go even further, for example, by requiring the victim to 
physically face the defendant “eyeball-to-eyeball” or by authorizing digging 
through private victim and witness information.4 Commentators have cele-
brated advances in the adversarial revolution as fortifying defendant rights 
at the expense of prosecutorial power.5 Yet the adversarial revolution also 
exacts severe costs on a crucial third player—victim-witnesses, especially 
in cases of traumatic crimes of sexual assault and violent crime generally.6 
The courts are in disarray about what—if anything—should be done to 
protect at-risk victims.7 The evidence is mounting that undergoing rituals of 
adversarial adjudication retraumatizes victims of violent and sexual assault 
crimes.8 Sometimes the legal dilemmas make it into the case reporters.9 
                                                                                                                           
 2 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 309–10, 312–13 (A.W. 
Brian Simpson ed., 2003). See generally United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 
682 (1958) (explaining that discovery was meant to “make trial less a game of blindman’s bluff 
and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent”). 
 3 See infra notes 139–213 and accompanying text. 
 4 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (holding that the trial court’s in 
camera review of the victim’s medical records is a procedure that fully protects the interests of 
both the defendant and the State); People v. Phillips, 315 P.3d 136, 152–53 (Colo. App. 2012) 
(collecting “eyeball-to-eyeball” jurisdictions); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 656–
57, 660 (Mass. 1997) (requiring the victim-witness to physically face the defendant while testify-
ing); People v. Jovanovic, 676 N.Y.S.2d 392, 392–93 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (describing how, pursuant to 
a defendant’s subpoena, Columbia University produced several computer disks consisting of 2400 
pages of emails from a student rape victim’s account for the court to review), rev’d, 700 N.Y.S.2d 
156, 163–65, 167–70, 172 (App. Div. 1999) (reversing on grounds that portions of emails between 
the defendant and victim admitted at trial should not have been redacted). 
 5 E.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 
1866–67 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Tri-
umph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 200–04 
(2005); Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1493, 1496–97 (2006); Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Deci-
sion Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2004); Miguel A. Méndez, 
Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 570–71, 607 (2004). 
 6 See infra notes 84–138 and accompanying text. 
 7 Compare State v. Folk, 256 P.3d 735, 744–47 (Idaho 2011) (reversing a conviction for lewd 
conduct with a child because the defendant was not allowed to personally cross-examine the vic-
tim), and Commonwealth v. Spear, 686 N.E.2d 1037, 1042–43 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (reversing a 
conviction because the victim was not forced to physically face the defendant while testifying), 
with United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing victim-witnesses to 
testify from another room through a two-way closed-circuit camera). 
 8 E.g., Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Interven-
tion, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 159–60 (2003) (explaining that the criminal justice system 
leaves crime victims exposed to a number of serious obstacles and risks); Uli Orth, Secondary 
Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 313, 315–16, 321 
(2002) (suggesting that criminal proceedings are frequently a “second victimization” for the crime 
victims involved). See generally Patricia A. Frazier & Beth Haney, Sexual Assault Cases in the 
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Sometimes they do not.10 The dramas behind the legal questions are brutal, 
even after the crime. 
D.G., for example, was a victim whose case did not make it into the 
reporters.11 The man who raped her repeatedly chose to self-represent so he 
could personally question her on the stand.12 Shortly before she was going 
to be trapped before him again for interrogation—legitimized as cross-
examination by a self-representing defendant—D.G. tried to commit suicide 
by jumping off the courthouse building.13 The intimidation by criminal pro-
cedure worked, and the prosecutors dropped her case.14 Prior to D.G.’s at-
tempted suicide, legislators introduced and debated a bill on multiple occa-
sions that would have protected victims like her from such retraumatiza-
                                                                                                                           
Legal System: Police, Prosecutor, and Victim Perspectives, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 607, 620 
(1996) (discussing data indicating that crime victims generally have negative attitudes towards the 
criminal justice system). 
 9 See, e.g., People v. Abel, 271 P.3d 1040, 1072–73 (Cal. 2012) (describing the lower court’s 
review of a witness’s mental health records at the defendant’s behest and concluding that “there 
was nothing of particular value to the defense”); Appelgate v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 266, 
273 (Ky. 2009) (holding that defendants may be restricted from personally cross-examining vic-
tims); Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992, 999–1002 (Mass. 1991) (holding that the 
trial court’s in camera review of the victim’s medical records was insufficient and that defendant’s 
conviction must be reversed because he was entitled to have access to the records before trial). 
 10 See, e.g., Diana Hefley, Juror’s ‘Research’ Forced Mistrial in Child Rape Case, HERALD 
EVERETT, WASH. (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20121212/NEWS
01/712129975/0/News, archived at http://perma.cc/7XF6-F2KD (describing the prosecutor’s 
difficult decision to plead a case of rape and molestation of a six-year-old child by her father down 
to incest, carrying a significantly lesser penalty, because he did not want to subject the child to the 
trauma of testifying again); Jolayne Houtz, When Children Face Attackers in Court—Advocates 
Say Victims’ Trauma Weighs Heavily, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 4, 1991), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19910804&slug=1298066, archived 
at http://perma.cc/R5MX-T6KW (detailing the trauma undergone by a 15-year-old rape victim 
when subjected to cross-examination by the self-representing rapist and discussing another case 
where a rapist questioned the woman he raped and was subsequently prosecuted for witness intim-
idation); Adam Tanner, My Lawyer, Myself: Self-Defense Often Fails, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(Feb. 10, 1995), http://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0210/10032.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VZL4-J9UL (describing the questioning of a victim who had been shot three times 
by a self-representing perpetrator). 
 11 See generally Amended Information at 3–4, State v. Cruz, No. 00-1-04270-8 SEA (Wash. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with author). 
 12 See Jennifer Sullivan, Rape Victim’s Threat to Jump Off Courthouse Roof May Derail 
Case, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 4, 2010, 9:14 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2013350
378_trial05m.html, archived at http://perma.cc/59G6-84BK. See generally Information at 4–5, 
Cruz, No. 00-1-04270-8 SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2000) (on file with author) (detailing the 
charges filed against the defendant). 
 13 Sullivan, supra note 12. 
 14 Jennifer Sullivan, Guilty Verdicts in Rape Trial Interrupted by Suicide Attempt, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2010, 1:25 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/theblotter/2013629694_man_on_
trial_for_sexual_assaul.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JJ63-FW99. 
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tion.15 The bill faltered because of concerns over whether it would conflict 
with the rights of defendants to self-represent and confront witnesses.16 
D.G.’s tragic story—and others like it—illustrate how the criminal jus-
tice system fails to protect survivors of attempted murder, rape, and other 
violent crimes from brutal rituals of adversarial adjudication, such as inter-
rogation by the perpetrator or exposure to retaliation.17 Courts and state leg-
islatures are exploring protective measures to lessen this harm.18 Efforts to 
reduce the risk of further injury are chilled, however, by doubts over poten-
tial conflict with murky criminal procedure protections.19 Framed in reac-
tion to controversial prosecutions for crimes against the sovereign, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See S.H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 2010). 
 16 See, e.g., H. Comm. Judiciary 2010-S.H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., at 2–3 (Wash. 2010) (noting 
constitutional concerns over the proposed bill); H. Comm. Judiciary 2010-H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., at 
2–3 (Wash. 2010) (same); see also Wash. State Legislature, Agenda: Executive Hearing, TVW 
(Feb. 26, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=201
0020175, archived at http://perma.cc/8YJG-JLSY [hereinafter Wash. State Legislature, Public 
Hearing #2] (providing archived webcasting regarding the proposed bill); Wash. State Legislature, 
Agenda: Public Hearing, TVW (Feb. 17, 2010, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2010021106 [hereinafter Wash. 
State Legislature, Public Hearing #1] (same). 
 17 See Sullivan, supra note 12 (reporting on a suicide attempt by a victim fearing cross-
examination by her childhood rapist); see also Associated Press, Victim to Confront Sniper Sus-
pect, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 21, 2003, at A4 (reporting on a sniper shooting victim’s fear 
over having to face the defendant again during cross-examination and her statement that “[t]here’s 
nothing worse than having to look at the man who tried to kill you”); Dionne Waugh, Batterer 
Loses After Arguing His Own Case, FT. WAYNE J.-GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2006, at 1C (highlighting a 
case where a batterer examined a victim in court despite a protective order forbidding contact with 
her). 
 18 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-161b (2005 & Supp. 2011) (requiring court authorization 
before defendants convicted of a family violence crime may subpoena the victim); Gigante, 166 
F.3d at 81–82 (allowing victim-witnesses to testify from another room through a two-way closed-
circuit camera); Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1034–36 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming the 
trial court’s refusal to allow self-representing defendant to question children he sexually abused 
and the court’s decision to appoint an attorney to pose the questions the defendant wished to ask); 
S.H.B. 2457 (proposing to protect sexual offense victims from defendant interrogation). 
 19 See, e.g., H. Comm. Judiciary 2010-S.H.B. 2457, supra note 16, at 2–3 (noting concern that 
a bill protecting rape victims from direct examination by perpetrators might conflict with defend-
ants’ rights to self-representation and confrontation); H. Comm. Judiciary 2010-H.B. 2457, supra 
note 16, at 2–3 (same); Cheryl Tucker, Judges Can—and Should—Protect Rape Victims, NEWS 
TRIBUNE (Jan. 15, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://blog.thenewstribune.com/opinion/2011/01/15/judges-
can-–-and-should-–-protect-rape-victims/, archived at http://perma.cc/6P95-877P (noting that in a 
difficult financial climate, “the last thing the state needs is a lot of costly constitutional challenges 
from convicted rapists willing to exploit any technical error in their trials”); infra note 214 (col-
lecting cases); cf. Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A 
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 802–08 (1986) (critiquing rape shield 
statutes and suggesting that some forms raise constitutional and other problems); Alexander Tan-
ford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 544, 545, 575–89 (1980) (expressing concerns regarding the constitutionality of certain rape 
shield laws). 
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treason and seditious libel, constitutional protections are fixated on the joust 
between defendant and state, and are cryptic about victim protections.20 
Judges with the courage to fashion procedures to reduce the harm to victims 
and witnesses risk reversal by appellate courts.21 When in doubt, the incen-
tives are to err on the side of the defendant.22 It is easier to legitimize the 
harms as part of ordinary criminal process—how we have always done 
things—and avert our gaze.23 
Yet the confrontation, discovery, and self-representation doctrines that 
suffocate protection today are not how we have always done things. For 
example, the landmark Confrontation Clause case allowing defendants to 
suppress statements by victims and witnesses who are unavailable for cross-
examination, Crawford v. Washington, was decided merely one decade ago 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975) (explaining that constitutional 
protections—like the right to self-representation—were fashioned in response to the tyrannical 
practices of the Star Chamber, which “specialized in trying ‘political’ offenses” and “has for cen-
turies symbolized disregard of basic individual rights”); 150 CONG. REC. 7294–96 (2004) (state-
ment of Sen. Diane Feinstein) (discussing the “dramatic disparity between the rights of defendants 
in our constitution and laws, and the rights of crime victims and their families”); infra notes 139–
213 and accompanying text. 
 21 E.g., People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901, 905 n.2, 910 (Mich. App. 1991) (reversing and 
remanding for a new entrapment hearing due to protective measures that were given to the witness 
that the defendant allegedly sought to have killed and mutilated); Jovanovic, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 392–
93 (describing how, pursuant to a defendant’s subpoena, Columbia University produced several 
computer disks consisting of 2400 pages of emails from a student rape victim’s account for the 
court to review), rev’d, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 163–65, 167–70, 172 (reversing on grounds that portions 
of emails between the defendant and victim admitted at trial should not have been redacted). 
 22 See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
§ 2-6, at 79 (3d ed. 2004) (advising that “[d]oubts or borderline cases should be resolved in the 
accused’s favor” in the context of deciding whether to admit defense evidence); Brian M. Hoff-
stadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1413, 1474–75 (2002) (discussing how, as a normative matter, American criminal procedure 
“is calculated to give the accused the benefit of the doubt and to err, if at all, on the side of the 
criminal defendant”). 
 23 It is oft-noted that the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses “have ancient roots” 
in Western civilization. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); see also FRANCIS H. 
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 104 (1951) (noting that this right predated the Sixth Amend-
ment as a common law right that “gained recognition as a result of the abuses in the trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh”). Take, for example, the illustrative content of one footnote in the 1959 U.S. 
Supreme Court case Greene v. McElroy: 
When Festus more than two thousand years ago reported to King Agrippa that Felix 
had given him a prisoner named Paul and that the priests and elders desired to have 
judgment against Paul, Festus is reported to have stated: “It is not the manner of the 
Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers 
face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid 
against him.” 
360 U.S. at 496 n.25. 
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by the Supreme Court.24 Other major hazards in the post-Crawford mine-
field are even more recent, such as the Court’s 2008 decision Giles v. Cali-
fornia, which opened the door for defendants who kill or intimidate wit-
nesses to argue that the victim’s evidence is inadmissible because the wit-
ness cannot be cross-examined.25 Another powerful source of intimidation 
tactics was created inadvertently in the 1975 Supreme Court case Faretta v. 
California, which created the right of self-representation—now used by 
perpetrators to personally interrogate their victims.26 Moreover, technology-
mediated lives yield new tactics of intimidation, such as perpetrators forc-
ing victims to turn over thousands of pages of private emails from their in-
boxes for judicial scrutiny, as happened to a Columbia student who alleged 
rape.27 
The landmark adversarial revolution cases upending practice and prec-
edent are purportedly justified in the name of historical practice and original 
intent.28 Yet the resulting rigid rules are more inflexible and harsh on vic-
tims and witnesses than historical practice.29 As happens in regimes born of 
ideological revolutions, the resulting reign of rules is harsher in the name of 
fidelity to an imagined inflexible ideal.30 Though draped in the mantle of 
tradition, the adversarial revolution is part of an invented tradition thought 
to be old, but that is actually neo-originalist.31 Like other invented tradi-
                                                                                                                           
 24 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
 25 554 U.S. 353, 366, 374 (2008). For a powerful critique of the perverse impact of Giles on 
domestic violence cases, see, for example, Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers 
Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 859–64, 871, 873–74 (2009). 
 26 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975). 
 27 See Jovanovic, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 392–93 (describing how a Columbia University student 
was forced to produce 2400 emails as part of a rape case). Notably, after piercing the victim’s 
privacy, the court found nothing directly relevant and material to the case. Id. 
 28 E.g., Giles, 554 U.S. at 358–66 (limiting the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing by inject-
ing into the analysis an element of intent and justifying this decision with a review of historical 
practices); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 n.3 (2006) (using an analysis of historical 
practices to hold that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to nontestimonial statements made 
to police during a 911 call); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–56 (imposing a new standard for admitting 
an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statements based on whether the statements were testimonial 
and justifying this decision as more true to original intent); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812–13, 816–17 
(explaining that an absolute right to self-represent in criminal trials is compelled by contemporary 
practices at the time that the Sixth Amendment was ratified); infra notes 102–213 and accompany-
ing text (illustrating how the implications of these cases have expanded greatly beyond the origi-
nal scope of these defendant rights). 
 29 See infra notes 102–138 and accompanying text. 
 30 Cf., e.g., JEREMY JENNINGS, REVOLUTION AND THE REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
THOUGHT IN FRANCE SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 9 (2011) (discussing Maximilien de 
Robespierre’s infamous French revolutionary regime and celebration of “inflexible justice”); Mat-
thew Edwards, The Rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: Internal or External Origins?, 35 
ASIAN AFFAIRS 56, 56–57 (2004) (discussing the suffering inflicted by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in 
the pursuit of ideological purity). 
 31 See infra notes 139–213 and accompanying text. 
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tions, it cultivates acceptance for a relatively recent ritual or practice by im-
plying fidelity with the venerable past.32 The adversarial revolution clothes 
its extension of rigid procedures in cases of victim crimes by hearkening 
back to ideals that historically emerged in cases involving prosecutions for 
crimes against the sovereign.33 
This Article challenges the rigid application of adversarial ideals 
grounded in a crimes-against-the-state paradigm to victim-crimes of sex and 
violence. The balance of interests, power, and the risk of overreaching are 
different between crimes against the state—at the core of adversarial protec-
tions—and crimes against victims at risk for retraumatization.34 This crucial 
distinction is obscured because commentary on major shifts in the law of 
confrontation, cross-examination, and self-representation is largely focused 
on the joust between the defense and prosecution.35 Concerns about putting 
the victim on trial or silencing the victim are generally expressed in litera-
ture concerning sexual assault and domestic violence.36 These scholars have 
typically focused on how to get evidence admitted in domestic violence and 
sexual assault prosecutions, where victims frequently are unavailable or 
unwilling to testify.37 
This Article illuminates the error and harms in rigidly applying princi-
ples historically forged for crimes against the sovereign to crimes against 
victims of sexual assault or general violent crime. When the conflict is not 
just between the defense and state power and there are at-risk victims and 
witnesses at stake, the constitutional calculus changes. As in other constitu-
tional contexts—such as First or Fourth Amendment protections—there is a 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 
1, 1–4, 8–9 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983). 
 33 See infra notes 139–213 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 220–257 and accompanying text. 
 35 E.g., Bellin, supra note 5, at 1866–67; Bibas, supra note 5, at 186, 200–04; Fisher, supra 
note 5, at 1496–97; Friedman, supra note 5, at 4–5; Méndez, supra note 5, at 570–71, 607. 
 36 E.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the Sound 
of Silence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1, 31–38, 44–49; Michael H. Graham, Fostering Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions After Crawford/Davis: Proposal for Legislative Action, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 871, 871 
(2008); Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1358–59 (2006); Lininger, 
supra note 25, at 859–64, 871, 873–74; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic 
Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5–9, 20–33 (2006); see also I. Ben-
nett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 843–47 (2013) (discussing the fed-
eral rape shield and sword laws, which are designed to encourage sexual assault victims to bring 
cases against their assailants and to render a victim’s past sexual history inadmissible at trial). 
 37 E.g., Bailey, supra note 36, at 43–54 (arguing for addressing root reasons why women are 
frightened to testify against batterers); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 
VA. L. REV. 747, 784–95 (2005) (arguing for the creation of pretrial opportunities for cross-
examination); Tuerkheimer, supra note 36, at 5, 49–54 (arguing—before Giles foreclosed the 
argument—that evidence of battered victims should be admitted based on a forfeiture by wrong-
doing theory). 
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core category of paradigmatic cases where protection is at its zenith. Out-
side the core countervailing restrictions should be less rigid about address-
ing weighty concerns.38 
Although sexual assault and domestic violence cases have correctly 
roused concern, the harms to victims and witnesses in violent crime cases 
generally should not be overlooked or normalized for two reasons. First, 
both types of traumatic assaults present pronounced risks of retraumatiza-
tion.39 Averting further harm is an important interest that justifies procedur-
al adaptations that reduce risk while still permitting fair adjudication.40 Sec-
ond, focusing on the impact upon victim-witnesses in violent crimes cases 
more generally creates interest linkage across genders. Violent crime can 
cause psychological injury to both men and women.41 Although women are 
disproportionately the victims of sexual assault, men are disproportionately 
the victims of violent crime.42 
Recognizing the important difference between crimes against the sover-
eign and crimes of sex and violence—where victims may be in need of pro-
tection—clears the quagmire of doubt facing courts and legislatures. Based 
on the crucial distinction elucidated, this Article defends the constitutionality 
of protective measures for at-risk victims and witnesses. Understanding the 
costs of adversarial process to victims and witnesses also widens the vision of 
possible solutions beyond protective measures embedded in adversarial pro-
cedure. This Article therefore also explores the promise and perils of bypass-
ing adversarial adjudication altogether.43 Contrary to the conventional view 
that restorative justice approaches are not suited for violent and sexual assault 
crimes,44 this Article argues that an adapted model designed to reduce adver-
                                                                                                                           
 38 See infra notes 220–257 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 59–83 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 214–295 and accompanying text; cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 
(1990) (“[The] physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently 
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in 
court.”). 
 41 See Chris R. Brewin et al., Fear, Helplessness, and Horror in Posttraumatic Stress Disor-
der: Investigating DSM-IV Criterion A2 in Victims of Violent Crime, 13 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 
499, 506–07 (2000) (discussing findings in a study of men and women on the association between 
intense fear, helplessness, or horror at the time of traumatic violent crime and PTSD symptoms). 
 42 See Janet L. Lauritsen & Karen Heimer, The Gender Gap in Violent Victimization, 1973-
2004, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 125, 133 & fig.1 (2008) (illustrating trends). Important-
ly, it has been noted that interest-convergence between the powerful and the subordinated is im-
portant in achieving lasting progress. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education 
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
 43 See infra notes 258–295 and accompanying text. 
 44 See James Ptacek, Editor’s Introduction, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, at ix, ix–x (James Ptacek ed., 2010) (discussing the widespread prohibition against using 
restorative justice practices in crimes against women such as intimate partner violence, rape, and 
child sexual abuse); see also C. Quince Hopkins & Mary P. Koss, Incorporating Feminist Theory 
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sarial process-related costs may be preferable for some victims and defend-
ants. 
The Article is organized into three parts. Part I frames the nature of the 
problem with which courts are wrestling: whether and how to protect vic-
tims from retraumatization by adversarial process. 45  This Part discusses 
how laws meant to shield defendants in cases of crimes against the sover-
eign are now being wielded to attack and intimidate victim-witnesses.46 Part 
II then delves into the murk of law that has emerged in recent decades that 
has provided cover for these attack strategies.47 Finally, Part III shows how 
the crucial distinction between crimes against the sovereign and victim 
crimes preserves discretion to pursue protective measures for at-risk victims 
in cases involving traumatic injury. 48  This Part also explores a farther-
reaching opt-out model requiring both defendant and victim consent to a 
non-adversarial system that averts some of the harshest costs of traditional 
criminal adjudication. 49 The goal is to offer justice and resolution in a way 
that reduces the risk of iatrogenic harm—that is, additional injury from the 
attempt to remedy the initial harm.50 
I. ADVERSARIAL PROCESS AND VICTIM-WITNESS INTIMIDATION 
Some crime survivors endure the indignities of adversarial adjudica-
tion, others flee, and others remember the pain of enduring.51 The brutality 
is drained or often altogether invisible in the official case reporters.52 And 
                                                                                                                           
and Insights into a Restorative Justice Response to Sex Offenses, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
693, 708–09 (2005) (discussing various criticisms of restorative justice generally, including its pro-
pensity to trivialize crime and failure to effect real change or prevent recidivism); Barbara Hudson, 
Restorative Justice and Gendered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice?, 42 BRIT. J. CRIM. 616, 
618–20 (2002) (discussing critiques of applying restorative justice approaches to domestic, sexual, 
and racial violence). 
 45 See infra notes 51–138 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 51–138 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 139–213 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 214–295 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 214–295 and accompanying text. 
 50 Various scholars have already applied the concept of iatrogenic harm—injury introduced 
by the attempt to cure—in the criminological context. E.g., Carl B. Clements et al., Systemic Is-
sues and Correctional Outcomes: Expanding the Scope of Correctional Psychology, 34 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 919, 922–24 (2007); Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence 
and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
173 176, 203 (2008); David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, A Half Century of Randomized 
Experiments on Crime and Justice, 34 CRIME & JUST. 55, 80 (2006); Michael Tonry, Has the 
Prison a Future?, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 3, 12 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (“Prison is 
iatrogenic, like a medicine that cures one ailment while causing another.”). 
 51 See infra notes 59–83 and accompanying text. 
 52 See, e.g., supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text (describing the tragic case of D.G., a 
victim whose rapist repeatedly chose to self-represent and who attempted to commit suicide by 
jumping off of a courthouse building to avoid facing her attacker). 
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even if the issues make it into an opinion, the legal framing is typically of-
fered from the defendant’s perspective.53 After all, it is the defendant who 
has the right to appeal the denial of his asserted right to stare into the eyes 
of the child he raped while the victim undergoes cross-examination.54 It is 
the defendant who wraps his claims in the rights of confrontation and self-
representation.55 It is not the victim who may appeal being trapped again 
before the violator in the legitimizing milieu of court. This Part discusses 
the arsenal of strategies that defendants can use to attack and intimidate vic-
tims under the cover of murky claimed constitutional rights.56 This Part also 
discusses the growth spurt of confrontation, self-representation, and related 
rights over the last decades, leaving constitutional murk and unanswered ques-
tions with which courts now wrestle.57 In turn, this uncertainty enveloping 
courts and legislatures chills attempts to create viable victim protections.58 
A. Legitimated Assault and the Law 
Scholars often and vigorously decry victim rights efforts.59 In legal ac-
ademic circles, the harms that victim-witnesses experience receive less at-
                                                                                                                           
 53 E.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015–20 (1988) (discussing the claim that the use of a 
screen between the defendant and testifying sexual abuse victims violated the defendant’s con-
frontation right); Spear, 686 N.E.2d at 1042–43 (holding that the defendant’s confrontation right 
was violated when the child was not forced to face him and was instead allowed to face the jury). 
 54 E.g., Spear, 686 N.E.2d at 1042–43 (reversing a conviction and holding that the defend-
ant’s confrontation right was violated when a child was not forced to face him); see also Phillips, 
315 P.3d at 152–53 (collecting “eyeball-to-eyeball” jurisdictions); Amirault, 677 N.E.2d at 656–
57, 660 (requiring the victim-witness to physically face the defendant while testifying). 
 55 E.g., Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014; Spear, 686 N.E.2d at 1042–43. 
 56 See infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 96–138 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 139–213 and accompanying text. 
 59 E.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2007) (criti-
cizing the victims’ rights movement as using the symbol of the victim as cover to achieve “more 
liability and punishment for the defendant” and pursue “conservative tough-on-crime ideology”); 
Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus Re-
habilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112–18, 1130–35 (2009) (arguing 
against victim rights in juvenile courts, contending that this imports a retributive impulse inappro-
priate in a rehabilitative context); Wayne A. Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of 
Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 721, 725, 766–75 (2008) (arguing that allowing the pathos of victims of mass 
violence to impact legal processes and decision making is perilous); Gregory P. Orvis, The Evolv-
ing Law of Victims’ Rights: Potential Conflicts with Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights 
and the Superiority of Civil Court Remedies, in CURRENT ISSUES IN VICTIMOLOGY RESEARCH 
163, 170–71 (Laura J. Moriarty & Robert A. Jerin eds., 1998) (criticizing the results of the vic-
tims’ rights movement); Danielle Levine, Comment, Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting 
the Victim’s Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 361 (2010) (ex-
pressing concern over giving victims participatory rights because of the worry that this would 
“elevate victims over the defendant” and “threaten the fair and just adjudication of a criminal 
case”). But see, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in a 
System of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 105 
2014] Adversarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection 785 
tention than needed. This Article parts ways with the dominant discourse in 
legal scholarship to call attention to the harms that victim-witnesses experi-
ence and how it is legitimated by the current confused state of the law. 
Many studies have found that the very pursuit of criminal justice can 
aggravate the harms of suffering violent crime or sexual assault.60 As one 
psychiatrist vividly explained: “If one set out intentionally to design a sys-
tem for provoking symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, it might look 
very much like a court of law.”61 Although open physical violence and in-
timidation are forbidden, the adversarial process involves “aggressive ar-
gument, selective presentation of the facts, and psychological attack.” 62 
Several studies have found associations between victims having to testify 
and the development of post-traumatic stress symptoms, though there are 
contradictory findings too. 63 Even short of post-traumatic stress disorder 
                                                                                                                           
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 177–82 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2011/1/LRColl2011n1Cassell&Joffee.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S8H7-YHUW (argu-
ing in favor of broadening victim participation in the criminal justice process); William T. Pizzi, 
Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our “Adversary System,” 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 364–65 (arguing 
about the import of victims’ rights, particularly in the American system, where victims have many 
disadvantages not present in other trial systems and defendants have many advantages not present 
in other trial systems). 
 60 See, e.g., Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, Secondary Victimization of Rape Victims: 
Insights from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence, 14 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 261, 269–70 (1999) (finding that eighty-one percent of mental health professionals who 
worked with rape victims indicated that reporting rape to criminal justice authorities “can be psy-
chologically detrimental to rape victims”); Rebecca Campbell, What Really Happened? A Valida-
tion Study of Rape Survivors’ Help-Seeking Experiences with the Legal and Medical Systems, 20 
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 55, 56, 61–62, 66–67 (2005); Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of 
Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182–83 
(2010). 
 61 Herman, supra note 8, at 159. 
 62 Id. The criminal justice system excuses these barbarities because of “the presumption that 
this ritualized, hostile encounter offers the best method of arriving at the truth.” Id. 
 63 Compare Rebecca Campbell et al., Preventing the “Second Rape”: Rape Survivors’ Expe-
riences with Community Service Providers, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1239, 1253–55 
(2001) (finding a positive association between legal secondary victimization and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms), Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, The Sexual Assault and 
Secondary Victimization of Female Veterans: Help-Seeking Experiences with Military and Civil-
ian Systems, 29 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 97, 104 (2005) (finding—consistent with past studies—a 
significant relationship between PTSD symptomology and experiencing secondary victimization 
in legal system contacts), and Jeffery N. Epstein et al., Predicting PTSD in Women with a History 
of Childhood Rape, 10 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 573, 583–84 (1997) (finding that testifying may be 
a predictor of PTSD among adult survivors of child rape), with Frazier & Haney, supra note 8, at 
626 (finding no relationship between victims’ attitudes toward the police or legal system and re-
covery nor between case outcomes and recovery, and suggesting that intrapersonal factors such as 
coping strategies may explain forty to fifty percent of variance in symptoms), and Ulrich Orth & 
Andreas Maercker, Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Crime Victims?, 19 J. INTERPERSON-
AL VIOLENCE 212, 222–25 (2004) (reporting findings from German test subjects suggesting that 
participation in trials in Germany is not retraumatizing). It is difficult to quantify the contribution 
of testifying to the development of PTSD because a person’s susceptibility and resilience also 
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(PTSD), the adversarial process causes severe stress to victims and discour-
ages them from engaging in the criminal justice system at all.64 
Some of the most basic aspects of adversarial adjudication are associ-
ated with harmful consequences. Victims face revelation of intimate and 
painful details—together with their identity—as a matter of public record.65 
In addition, adversarial questioning of victims on the stand can aggravate 
self-blame and doubt. 66 A study of rape victims found that testifying in 
court was among the top five “fearful cues” for victims and was the central 
cause of anxiety a year after the crime.67 Another study found that rape vic-
tims scored higher in distress measures after pursuing criminal prosecution 
of their cases than victims whose cases were not prosecuted.68 
This gauntlet for victims who pursue justice continues despite rape law 
reforms beginning in the 1970s and state attempts at victim protections be-
ginning in the 1980s.69 A 2005 small-scale study of sexual assault victims 
found high rates of negative interactions with the legal system, resulting in 
disappointment (ninety percent) and reluctance to seek further help (eighty 
                                                                                                                           
depends on a variety of other factors, including the circumstances of the traumatic exposure, what 
happens after, and individual biological and socioeconomic risk factors. See, e.g., Jessica Bomyea 
et al., A Consideration of Select Pre-Trauma Factors as Key Vulnerabilities in PTSD, 32 CLINI-
CAL PSYCHOL. REV. 630, 632–38 (2012); Chris R. Brewin et al., Meta-Analysis of Risk Factors 
for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Trauma-Exposed Adults, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 748, 753 (2000); Sarah E. Ullman & Henrietta H. Filipas, Predictors of PTSD Symptom 
Severity and Social Reactions in Sexual Assault Victims, 14 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 369, 383–87 
(2001). 
 64 See Rebecca Korzec, Viewing North Country: Sexual Harassment Goes to the Movies, 36 
U. BALT. L. REV. 303, 314 (2007) (observing that the potential exposure of sexual harassment 
victims’ private information during trial can deter them from utilizing the adversarial system); 
Orth & Maercker, supra note 63, at 213 (noting it is widely accepted that attending trials of perpe-
trators “frequently leads to severe psychological stress among victims”); cf. Lynne Henderson, 
Revisiting Victim's Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 401 (describing how victims perceive the 
adversarial system to benefit the defendant at their expense). 
 65 Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame, and Community: Justice Responses to Violence Against 
Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332, 1335–36 (2000). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Parsons & Bergin, supra note 60, at 183. 
 68 Patricia A. Cluss et al., The Rape Victim: Psychological Correlates of Participation in the 
Legal Process, 10 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 342, 354–55 (1983). 
 69 See, e.g., DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME 
VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 10 (1998), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/173839.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V7ET-BTUR (noting that alt-
hough victim protection laws that required criminal justice officials to better inform and consult 
with victims generally improved satisfaction, victim dissatisfaction with experiences in the crimi-
nal justice system remained widespread); Campbell & Raja, supra note 60, at 262–63, 267–68 
(noting persistent problems of secondary victimization despite the rape law reforms of the 1970s 
and 1980s); Frazier & Haney, supra note 8, at 621 (finding that despite improvements following 
legal reforms, victims report negative experiences with the legal system and widely perceive that 
defendants have more rights than victims and that victims are left unprotected). 
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percent).70 A larger-scale study of sexual assault victim perspectives during 
the mid-1990s found that although perceptions of police were positive, eve-
ry measure of views toward the legal system was negative.71 To the victims 
surveyed, it seemed that “rapists [had] more rights than victims, that vic-
tims’ rights [were] not protected, and that the system [was] unfair.”72 Simi-
larly, although victims in states with victim protection laws tend to be better 
informed about their cases and have a more favorable impression of offi-
cials who are required to consult with them, many remain very dissatisfied 
with their experience in the criminal justice system.73 
Even advances in protections in sexual assault law—such as rape 
shield laws preventing the introduction of a victim’s sexual reputation or 
history—are sometimes criticized as going too far.74 Yet, the reality is these 
protections are merely isolated islets of protections in the vast and tumultu-
ous rapids of the adversarial process. First, these protections only tackle 
certain problems, such as preventing rape victims’ sexual histories from 
being publicized at trial, keeping victims apprised of important develop-
ments (such as the release of a violent perpetrator), and preventing victims’ 
voices from being shut out at adjudication.75 Moreover, purported shields 
may function more like sieves because of gaps and loopholes in the rules.76 
Similarly, victims’ rights laws may not be enforced or may be underen-
forced.77 And more fundamentally, to the extent they exist, victim protec-
tion laws are focused heavily on certain narrow areas—such as rape shield 
laws or victim participation—while leaving other avenues of attack open.78 
Adversarial procedure offers a host of other intimidation tactics as part 
of ordinary procedure.79 For example, defendants assert the right to directly 
examine victims in close quarters, force victims to physically face them, 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Campbell, supra note 60, at 61–62. 
 71 Frazier & Haney, supra note 8, at 621. 
 72 Id. at 620. 
 73 KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 10. 
 74 E.g., Galvin, supra note 19, at 812–902 (critiquing rape shield statutes and suggesting that 
some forms raise constitutional and other problems); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 19, at 545, 
575–89 (expressing concerns regarding the constitutionality of certain rape shield laws). 
 75 See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997) (arguing that rape shield laws have “generally had little or 
no effect on the outcomes of rape cases” and that more needs to be done in order to adequately 
protect victims). 
 76 See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual 
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 131–41 (2002) (discussing how 
rape shield laws may function as sieves through which intimidation and attack can continue). 
 77 See, e.g., KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 9–10 (reporting findings of underenforce-
ment of victims’ rights laws even in states that have enacted such legislation). 
 78 See Anderson, supra note 76, at 131–41. 
 79 See infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text (discussing three main strategies of attack 
from adversarial adjudication’s arsenal of defendant prerogatives). 
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and engage in intrusive fishing expeditions through victims’ emails and 
health records.80 Studies have found that victims of violent crime view the 
legal system with anxiety because of the risk of incurring further trauma.81 
Overall, the data suggests that “victims who choose to seek justice may face 
serious obstacles and risks to their health, safety, and mental health.”82 Con-
cerns over the harmful consequences of undergoing legal process likely 
contribute to low reporting rates for sexual assault and violent crimes as 
well as victims’ hesitancy to seek justice in the legal system.83 
B. Converting Protections Against the State into Swords Against Victims 
The law of adversarial adjudication has converted historical protections 
forged to prevent abuses in prosecutions for crimes against the state into 
swords that can be used to attack victims again with impunity. Although de-
fendants are not free to physically attack or threaten victim-witnesses in order 
to dissuade their pursuit of justice,84 this Part shows how muscularly inter-
preted adversarial process rights provide an arsenal of tactics to retraumatize 
victims of sexual assault and general violent crime. 
1. Attack Strategies 
There are at least three main strategies of intimidation that defendants 
employ. First, as a matter of right in many jurisdictions, defendants may 
force victims—including those that were allegedly shot, raped, or stabbed 
by them—to physically face them while on the stand.85 From just a simple 
lunge away, victims are required to testify and have their credibility judged, 
tested, and challenged on cross-examination. The defendant may even pack 
the room with others meant to intimidate—perhaps family members who 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 81 See, e.g., Parsons & Bergin, supra note 60, at 182–83 (collecting studies in meta-review). 
 82 Herman, supra note 8, at 159. 
 83 Parsons & Bergin, supra note 60, at 183. 
 84 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (prescribing penalties for attempting to kill, killing, 
using physical force, threatening to use physical force, intimidating, or harassing another person to 
prevent the person from testifying); CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2014) (pre-
scribing penalties for knowingly or maliciously preventing or attempting to prevent any witness 
from testifying and higher penalties where force or threat of force or violence was used); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §§ 215.15–.16 (McKinney 2010) (defining and prescribing penalties for three degrees 
of witness intimidation). For a discussion of victim and witness intimidation laws, see, for exam-
ple, KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM AND WITNESS INTIMIDATION: 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND EMERGING RESPONSES 6, 10 (1995), available at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles/witintim.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6B6-WUKY. 
 85 See, e.g., Phillips, 315 P.3d at 152–53 (collecting “eyeball-to-eyeball” jurisdictions); Spear, 
686 N.E.2d at 1042–43; Sarah M. Dunn, “Face to Face” with the Right of Confrontation: A Cri-
tique of the Supreme Court of Kentucky's Approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Kentucky 
Constitution, 96 KY. L.J. 301, 316–17 (2008). 
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are angry at the victim for revealing ugly secrets, gang members, or other 
hostile onlookers.86 If the victim requests even a simple adjustment to ease 
some of the intense stress, such as to testify facing away from the defend-
ant, the defendant can slap back, citing cases holding that this would violate 
the defendant’s right of confrontation.87 
Second, to enhance the intimidation effect, defendants may choose to 
self-represent and personally question victims. 88  Required to be on the 
stand, victims will be trapped again before their attackers and forced to 
obediently answer their questions.89 The defendant may even wish to fur-
ther enhance the intimidation effect by seeking pretrial contact with the vic-
tim, perhaps exposing the victim to retraumatizing material, such as videos 
of the assault.90 Some defendants have openly admitted that the only reason 
they choose to self-represent is to be able to personally question their victim 
on the stand.91 
Third, the perpetrator may seek to dredge through the victim’s emails, 
mental health records, and medical records.92 Even if the judge puts some 
limits on the fishing expedition by screening for relevance in camera before 
releasing the documents to the defendant, the privacy harm is already done. 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See HEALEY, supra note 84, at 4 (discussing common courtroom intimidation tactics such 
as having the defendant’s family and friends give intimidating looks or gestures at a witness dur-
ing court proceedings or court-packing by gang members who may wear black to symbolize death, 
stare intently at the witness, or use threatening hand signals that judges, prosecutors, and court 
personnel do not understand or may be reluctant to forbid). 
 87  See, e.g., Phillips, 315 P.3d at 152–53 (collecting “eyeball-to-eyeball” jurisdictions); 
Amirault, 677 N.E.2d at 660, 623, 632 (holding that a procedure that allowed a child rape victims 
to testify with their backs facing the defendant violated the defendant’s state constitutional right of 
confrontation); Spear, 686 N.E.2d at 1043 (same). 
 88 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 822 (constitutionalizing the right to self-represent). 
 89 See Crime Victim’s Petition for Review of a Special Action Decision of the Arizona Court 
of Appeals at 1, Doe v. Lee, No. 1 CA-SA 07-20063 (Ariz. June 19, 2007), 2007 WL 4939462, at 
*1 [hereinafter Crime Victim’s Petition for Review] (“Now Jane Doe, . . . after being held captive 
for hours by the Defendant[,] . . . discovers that when the Defendant’s criminal trial begins on 
June 19th, 2007—[he] will once again hold her captive, only this time he will do so with the sanc-
tion of the State.”). 
 90 See L.C. v. Gilbert, No. C09-5586 BHS, 2010 WL 1641533, at *1–2 (W.D. Wa. Apr. 21, 
2010) (noting that the defendant plead guilty to charges of sexual exploitation of a minor in the pro-
duction of child pornography); Alyssa Newcomb, Washington Rape Suspect Wants Victims to View 
Videotapes Before Trial, ABC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/washington-rape-
suspect-victims-view-videotapes-trial/story?id=16898831#.UBmGzPXmVNI, archived at http://perma.
cc/4QL5-KB47 (reporting on the L.C. v. Gilbert defendant’s attempt to conduct pretrial interviews 
with the boys he exploited to show them the pornographic videos that he took of them). 
 91 See Murray, 49 F.3d at 1034 (noting such an admission by the defendant). 
 92 See, e.g., Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52 (holding that the trial court’s in camera review of the vic-
tim’s medical records is a procedure that fully protects the interests of both the defendant and the 
State); United States v. Briggs, 48 M.J. 143, 145 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (considering a case where the 
defendant requested all of the victim’s medical records, including any mental health records, and 
holding that trial judges should review such records in camera when the defendant makes such a 
request). 
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And even if certain details will be redacted from the documents before dis-
tribution to the defendant, victims may be hesitant to seek justice through 
the courts if doing so will subject them to such invasive review of their pri-
vate lives.93 
Such tactics may lead to dismissal or discounting of charges because a 
victim-witness may drop out in fear, or a prosecutor may give a lenient plea 
bargain to spare a vulnerable or reluctant victim-witness the ordeal of testi-
fying.94 Even if the victim denies the defendant these windfalls by suffering 
through the attacks and persisting, the defendant can nonetheless use such 
intimidation tactics to punish the pursuit of justice. The hidden nature of 
these harms makes their extent hard to quantify unless dramatic facts make 
it into newspapers.95 
2. Sources of Law 
These various intimidation tactics use federal and state constitutional 
protections for defendants to bludgeon victims who seek justice. At the over-
arching constitutional level, the Sixth Amendment is a key source of asserted 
entitlement by defendants to engage in aggressive tactics. The wellspring of 
rights “basic to our adversary system of justice,”96 the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides: 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Unfortunately, because certain state laws provide for in camera review, victim-witnesses 
who seek justice must nonetheless endure the humiliation of a court-sanctioned fishing expedition 
through their personal health information and emails. See, e.g., Abel, 271 P.3d at 1072–73 (de-
scribing the court’s review of a witness’s mental health records at the defendant’s behest and ulti-
mately concluding that “there was nothing of particular value to the defense”); Stockhammer, 570 
N.E.2d at 999–1002 (holding that the trial court’s in camera review of the victim’s medical rec-
ords was insufficient and that defendant’s conviction must be reversed because he was entitled to 
have access to the records before trial); Jovanovic, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 392–93 (describing how pur-
suant to a defendant’s subpoena, Columbia University produced several computer disks consisting 
of 2400 pages of emails from the account of a student alleging rape for the court to review), rev’d, 
700 N.Y.S.2d at 163–65, 167–70, 172 (reversing on grounds that portions of emails between the 
defendant and victim admitted at trial should not have been redacted); see also Wendy J. Murphy, 
Minimizing the Likelihood of Discovery of Victims’ Counseling Records and Other Personal In-
formation in Criminal Cases: Massachusetts Gives a Nod to a Constitutional Right to Confidenti-
ality, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 983, 986–96 (1998) (detailing the tortured history of Massachusetts 
statutes and case law regarding defendant access to victim rape counseling records). 
 94 See Hefley, supra note 10 (describing a prosecutor’s difficult decision to plead a case of 
rape and molestation of a six-year-old child by her father down to incest—carrying a significantly 
lesser penalty—because the prosecutor did not want to subject the child to the trauma of testifying 
again); Sullivan, supra note 12 (noting how an attempted suicide by a victim-witness on the eve of 
trial caused prosecutors to drop charges against one defendant). 
 95 See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text (describing the tragic case of D.G., a victim 
whose rapist repeatedly chose to self-represent and who attempted to commit suicide by jumping 
off of a courthouse building to avoid facing her attacker). 
 96 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. 
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense.97 
Defendants draw from three central rights grounded in the Sixth Amend-
ment as useful cover for intimidation tactics. The first is the Confrontation 
Clause.98 Second is the Compulsory Process Clause,99 which is supplement-
ed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the context 
of discovery rights.100 The third right—the entitlement to self-represent—is 
not explicitly in the text of the Sixth Amendment, but was nevertheless held 
to be implicitly protected by the Sixth Amendment by the Supreme Court in 
Faretta.101 
3. Exceeding the Purpose and Origins of Adversarial Rights 
Of course, none of these rights were crafted with the aim of giving the 
defendant a tactical advantage in retraumatizing their victims. Indeed, these 
rights were generally not crafted with victims in mind at all; instead, the 
Bill of Rights is focused on protecting defendants because of the concern 
over the balance of power between the State and the defendant.102 
                                                                                                                           
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 98 See Amirault, 677 N.E.2d at 656–57, 660 (requiring the victim-witness to physically face 
the defendant while testifying based on the defendant’s confrontation right). See generally Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 50–51 (explaining the history and construction of the Confrontation Clause). 
 99 See, e.g., Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52 (holding that the trial court’s in camera review of the vic-
tim’s medical records is a procedure that fully protects the interests of both the defendant and the 
State); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967) (holding that the right to compel the 
attendance of witnesses is “the right to present a defense” and that this right is “a fundamental 
element of due process law”). 
 100 See Abel, 271 P.3d at 1072–73 (noting ambiguity as to whether the Confrontation or Com-
pulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment include pretrial discovery rights for defendants, but 
concluding that, at any rate, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause confers such a right). 
 101 See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 819 (“Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the 
right to self-representation—to make one’s own defense personally—is thus necessarily implied 
by the structure of the amendment.”); see also Crime Victim’s Petition for Review, supra note 89, 
at *1 (describing how a defendant’s former captive was essentially forced into further state-
sanctioned captivity due to the defendant’s self-representation at trial). 
 102 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and the Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1529, 1607 (2000) (noting that unless and until a victims’ rights amendment is 
adopted, “the Constitution is concerned with criminal defendants’ rights but not those of vic-
tims”); Herman, supra note 8, at 160–63 (discussing the harms of the criminal justice focus on 
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The specific adoption history surrounding Sixth Amendment rights is 
scarce because the provisions were adopted with little debate or controver-
sy. 103  Nevertheless, helpful intellectual histories of the evolution of the 
rights in key formative periods and central paradigm cases of concern have 
emerged and continue to influence Sixth Amendment doctrine.104 The para-
digmatic cases behind key constitutional criminal procedure protections 
involve controversial inquisitorial practices and crimes against the sover-
eign—such as treason, seditious libel, and customs violations—that fore-
grounded adversarial conflict between the sovereign and the accused.105 The 
dangers of abuses in prosecutions for crimes against the State are particular-
ly acute because the victim and prosecution are the same—and immensely 
powerful—rather than a humble individual harmed and hoping for jus-
tice.106 
                                                                                                                           
defendant interests and lack of attention to processual harms to victims); infra notes 103–138 and 
accompanying text (discussing the historical concerns over this imbalance). 
 103 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting 
the lack of debate and scant record regarding the adoption of the Confrontation Clause, which 
“was apparently included without debate along with the rest of the Sixth Amendment package of 
rights—to notice, counsel, and compulsory process”); JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 20 (Jack Stark ed., 2002) (“While many other rights were the subjects 
of considerable discussion during the congressional formulation of and the states’ ratifications of 
the Bill of Rights, there was very little mention of the right to counsel.”). 
 104 E.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44–45 (holding that the Confrontation Clause allows defend-
ants to suppress statements by victims and witnesses who are unavailable for cross-examination); 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 822–30 (identifying a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation); Mattox 
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240–41, 243–44 (1895) (holding that the Confrontation Clause is 
not offended by the introduction of testimony by an unavailable witness so long as the defendant 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination); HELLER, supra note 23, at 13–34, 109–38 (dis-
cussing the development of the Confrontation Clause and key cases); LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 
3–105, 233–305 (same). 
 105 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44–45 (discussing the influence of the treason trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh, who was denied the opportunity to confront his accuser); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
822–30 (explaining how the right to self-representation spawned as a response to the tyrannical 
practices of the Star Chamber, which “has for centuries symbolized disregard of basic individual 
rights”); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240–41, 243–44 (employing a historical analysis to conclude that the 
Confrontation Clause is primarily concerned with ensuring an opportunity for cross-examination); 
see also J.A.C. GRANT, OUR COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 12 (1960) (discussing the develop-
ment of protections in response to the inquisitorial nature of criminal proceedings and the subse-
quent decline of such procedural abuses); 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, 
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6345 (2012) (discussing the influence of 
controversies over the inquisitorial practices of vice-admiralty courts); Kenneth Graham, Confron-
tation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 209, 220 (2005) (arguing that the 
American confrontation right is influenced by “hatred of the theologians who provided the doctri-
nal basis for heresy prosecutions” and “colonial objections to customs informers”). 
 106 See LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that adversarial criminal procedure was 
initially “a special-purpose procedure for cases of treason, meant to even up for the particular 
hazards that such prosecutions were thought to pose for defendants”). 
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The cases that concerned the Founders involved far more ham-fisted 
inquisitorial practices than those covered by the highly technical doctrine 
today. Consider, for example, the Confrontation Clause, which restates an 
old common law rule that began crystallizing in the 1600s.107 The right of 
confrontation developed in opposition to infamous cases in which defend-
ants were convicted based on out-of-court statements taken by unseen wit-
nesses—some of whom were subjected to torture.108 A central and oft-noted 
example is the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason.109 The Crown’s 
case against Raleigh was based on a signed confession secured from his 
alleged accomplice Baron Cobham—who later retracted his statement.110 
Protesting the procedure as trial “by the Spanish Inquisition,” Raleigh ar-
gued: “The proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham 
be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face.”111 Raleigh was 
convicted and sentenced to death without ever having a chance to face Cob-
ham and challenge his account.112 In the colonies, there was also outcry 
over the inquisitorial practices of vice-admiralty courts enforcing customs 
and taxation laws by relying on informers without opportunity for confron-
tation or trial by jury.113 
Similarly, the right to compulsory process provides a correction for 
another severe historical imbalance between the State and defendant. The 
Compulsory Process Clause overturns the common law rule that defendants 
prosecuted by the Crown for felonies or treason had no right to compel wit-
nesses to appear.114 The roots of the Compulsory Process Clause trace to 
statutes beginning in 1701 permitting defense witnesses to testify under 
oath.115 These reforms began eroding the common law rule so that within a 
                                                                                                                           
 107 DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS TODAY 94 (1976). 
 108 GRANT, supra note 105, at 12. 
 109 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44–45 (discussing the import of this infamous case); HEL-
LER, supra note 23, at 104 (“The right of the accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him did not originate with the . . . Sixth Amendment, but was a com-
mon law right which had gained recognition as a result of the abuses in the trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh.”); Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court’s Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383, 384 (1990) (noting the significance of this case). But see 
Graham, supra note 105, at 209, 213, 216 (arguing that the Supreme Court used “spurious history” 
in Crawford and that the oft-invoked influence of the Raleigh case is a “romantic myth”). 
 110 GRANT, supra note 105, at 12. 
 111 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 112 Id. 
 113 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 105, § 6345; PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 13 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). 
 114 GRANT, supra note 105, at 4. For prosecutions initiated by private actors, the defendant 
could subpoena witnesses because these proceedings were considered civil in form, though crimi-
nal in effect. Id. at 4 n.13. Furthermore, although felons could not subpoena witnesses, misde-
meanants retained this privilege. Id. 
 115 FELLMAN, supra note 107, at 98; GRANT, supra note 105, at 4. 
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generation, compulsory process became available to felons.116 At its core, 
the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause—like the Confronta-
tion Clause—is about the right to mount a defense and is intended to coun-
teract a severe imbalance in the defendant’s power to do so.117 
The right to counsel also emerged to counteract historical imbalances 
of power between defendant and state. 118  The right to counsel is oft-
celebrated as central to ensuring that the accused has aid against “the prose-
cutorial forces of organized society” in an adversarial system.119 Historical-
ly, Anglo common law refused to allow people accused of felonies or trea-
son to even retain counsel because of concern that the government was so 
weak and its enemies so strong that the government needed every ad-
vantage.120 As an English judge and historian reported, the resulting crimi-
nal trial “was not unlike a race between the King and the prisoner, in which 
the King had a long start and the prisoner was heavily weighted.”121 Trea-
son and felonies were considered a particular threat to the State because the 
former was directed against the sovereign and the latter caused social insta-
bility.122 
Eventually, statutory reforms introduced the right to counsel for de-
fendants charged with treason—but not felonies.123 This shift resulted from 
the Whig Party’s rise to power and its enactment of statutory reform in re-
sponse to past experience with false treason charges brought by political 
                                                                                                                           
 116 GRANT, supra note 105, at 4. 
 117 ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 71, 115 (1992); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. 
L. REV. 71, 74 (1974). As Justice John Marshall Harlan II noted in his concurring opinion to Cali-
fornia v. Green: 
If anything, the confrontation guarantee may be thought, along with the right to 
compulsory process, merely to constitutionalize the right to a defense as we know it, 
a right not always enjoyed by the accused, whose only defense prior to the late 17th 
century was to argue that the prosecution had not completely proved its case. 
399 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 118 GARCIA, supra note 117, at 3–4. 
 119 See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008); accord Martinez v. Ryan, 
132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (observing that “the right to counsel is the foundation for our adver-
sary system” and that “[d]efense counsel tests the prosecution’s case . . . while protecting the 
rights of the person charged”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (“[I]n our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”). See generally TOMKOVICZ, 
supra note 103, at 2–21 (discussing the history of the right to counsel). 
 120 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823–24; 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196 (2d 
ed. 1937). 
 121  1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 397 
(1883). 
 122 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 103, at 3–4. 
 123 GARCIA, supra note 117, at 3. 
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opponents.124 The reform was likely limited to treason because the imbal-
ance of power was particularly pronounced in treason cases, where trained 
lawyers for the State prosecuted the accused.125 In contrast, there was a rela-
tively less pronounced imbalance in power in most other criminal cases, 
where laypersons, rather than professionals, prosecuted the accused.126 
Initially in the colonies, the imbalance of power between the State and 
the defendant was less pronounced because trials were informal and the par-
ties were private laypersons.127 Criminal justice practices around the time of 
the Founding were far less hyper-regulated and hypertechnical than the ar-
cane constitutional criminal procedure doctrine today.128 Most of the surviv-
ing records from the era do not address the everyday operation of criminal 
courts.129 The court records that are available indicate that the vast majority 
of defendants “were dealt with in a great rush, and quite summarily.”130 The 
criminal justice system was far different than the modern system, with its 
professional forces of public defenders, probation officers, full-time prose-
cutors, and trained police forces.131 Indeed, the State hardly had a monopoly 
on prosecution—with the practice of private prosecution of crimes persist-
ing in Philadelphia, for example, until the 19th century.132 Private citizens 
also assisted government officials posse-style, rendering the line “between 
riot and disorder on the one hand and law enforcement on the other . . . far 
from distinct.”133 
By the beginning of the 18th century, however, the colonies began us-
ing professional and trained public prosecutors, culminating in the right to 
counsel for the accused.134 And by the time of the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment, twelve of the thirteen colonies had rejected the English com-
mon law rule tilting the adversarial playing field in favor of the sovereign 
and recognized a right to counsel for the criminally accused.135 
The abuses of the 16th and 17th centuries that shaped the development 
of the adversarial protections in the Sixth Amendment are phantoms of the 
                                                                                                                           
 124 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 103, at 6. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 5; John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 
277–82 (1978). 
 127  WILLIAM MERRITT BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 13–18 
(1972). 
 128 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 286 (2d ed. 1985). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 286–87; see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006) (noting “the increas-
ing professionalism of police forces” over the last half-century). 
 132 FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 287. 
 133 Id. 
 134 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 103, at 9–10. 
 135 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64–66 (1932) (discussing this history). 
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past. For much of the nation’s history, the constitutional criminal procedural 
protections had little practical significance because they bound the federal 
government, rather than the states—where most criminal prosecutions oc-
cur.136 The Court thus had little occasion for interpretation, keeping key 
provisions of the amendment essentially dormant.137 
Since incorporation of the rights to the states beginning in the 1960s, 
the rights of confrontation, compulsory process, and self-representation 
have exploded in doctrinal complexity, ambiguity, and scope.138 The next 
Part explores how these increasingly potent doctrines—especially the huge-
ly expanded right to confront and the constitutionalized right to self-
represent—chill attempts to prevent misuse of these rights when they are 
used as bludgeons against victims who choose to pursue justice. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL MURK AND THE CHILLING OF PROTECTION 
The history behind the rights of confrontation, compulsory process, 
and counsel suggests that these provisions were meant to prevent “flagrant 
abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses.”139 Yet these 
constitutional provisions have expanded in scope and grown new limbs to 
govern more complex questions of how to balance the accused’s interests 
alongside society’s interests in justice and the protection of victims.140 The 
questions today are no longer about blatant preclusion of defense counsel, 
trial by affidavits, or the inability to present witnesses in one’s defense.141 
Rather, the expansion and constitutionalization of the adversarial process 
has put into doubt the ability of states and courts to protect victims after 
traumatic assaults.142 The rapid growth in law has seemingly overlooked the 
                                                                                                                           
 136 MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE WARREN 
COURT REVOLUTION 2–3 (2011); TOMKOVICZ, supra note 103, at 21–22. 
 137 HELLER, supra note 23, at 139. 
 138 See infra notes 143–213 and accompanying text; see also SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERM-
IEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 230–40 (2010) (discussing the expansion of consti-
tutional criminal procedure since the 1960s). 
 139 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (surveying the 
history of the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses); supra notes 103–138 and accom-
panying text (describing this history). 
 140 See infra notes 143–213 and accompanying text. 
 141 See generally infra notes 142–213 and accompanying text (discussing paradigmatic con-
cerns prompting the evolution of the rights to confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel). 
 142 See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text (discussing one particularly tragic tale of 
legislative inaction leading to an attempted suicide); infra notes 143–213 and accompanying text 
(discussing hurdles to protecting victim-witnesses from being forced to endure face-to-face ques-
tioning at trial); infra note 214 (collecting cases). In fact, sometimes, not even protection orders 
can spare victims and witnesses from legitimized retraumatization. See Waugh, supra note 17 
(reporting on a case where a batterer was allowed to personally cross-examine the victim he beat 
and whose clothes he sliced off with a knife despite a protective order forbidding him to approach 
her). 
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important difference between crimes against the State and crimes against 
victims. In determining the scope of protections for defendants and victim-
witnesses, this distinction is important in finding a way through the murky 
quagmire of law. 
A. The Rather Embarrassing Right to Self-Represent 
The Supreme Court constitutionalized the right to self-represent in 
1975 in Faretta v. California.143 Though in theory the right romanticizes the 
freedom to personally battle the prosecution, self-representation in practice 
is a bit of an embarrassment. Attorneys and judges with trial experience are 
acutely aware of the excruciating inefficiency of self-represented litigants. 
In fact, these litigants have been reported by judges to be “an increasing 
problem,” “very time-consuming,” “clogging the system,” “kooky,” “nuts,” 
and “pests.”144 Even the Faretta Court admitted that “the right of an ac-
cused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain” of the 
Court’s holding that “the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defend-
ant a fair trial.”145 Faretta also conceded that “in most criminal prosecu-
tions[,] defendants [can] better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their 
own unskilled efforts.”146 The Court later remarked: “No one, including . . . 
the Faretta majority, attempts to argue that as a rule pro se representation is 
wise, desirable, or efficient.”147 Thus, even the decision conferring a right of 
self-representation to defendants expressed misgivings. 
The historical peculiarities of early colonial self-representation, its 
questionable basis in the Constitution, and the modern abuses of this privi-
lege by criminal defendants all point towards limiting the right to self-
representation. As a purely textual matter, the Sixth Amendment never men-
tions a right to self-represent.148 A defendant stubbornly declining a free 
professional defense attorney is a luxurious modern-day legal challenge. In 
contrast, in early American colonial history, people often self-represented as 
a matter of necessity because of the scarcity of lawyers and because of the 
English common law prohibition on having counsel in felony cases.149 Self-
reliant early colonists also mistrusted “professional” lawyers, who were 
                                                                                                                           
 143 422 U.S. 806, 823–24 (1975). 
 144 JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A RE-
PORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 59, 60, 121 (1998) (reporting the 
experience of state court judges with time-consuming and burdensome pro se litigants). 
 145 422 U.S. at 832–33. 
 146 Id. at 834. 
 147 Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000). 
 148  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823–24 (admitting the right to self-
represent constitutionalized by the case is “not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many words”). 
 149 See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823–24; GARCIA, supra note 117, at 3–4; TOMKOVICZ, su-
pra note 103, at 14. 
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identified with the Crown, the upper-class, and the reek of dependence.150 
Furthermore, because of animosity toward lawyers in theocratically influ-
enced colonies, some colonies even prohibited the practice of law and ap-
pointed judges without legal training.151 Finally, self-reliance in one’s de-
fense was more feasible then because the nonprofessional prosecution ren-
dered the match more even.152 
As the colonies advanced and developed, however, the value of profes-
sional legal advice became better appreciated and attitudes toward the im-
port of having counsel changed. 153  State constitutions—and finally, the 
Sixth Amendment—codified the right to have counsel, definitively rejecting 
the old English common law rule.154 The impetus for the right to counsel 
was the unavailability of counsel that previously made self-representation a 
necessity.155 Thus, by the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted, the need 
to assure self-representation had faded in light of the availability of outside 
counsel. 
Moreover, when legislators wanted to spell out a right to self-represent 
around the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, they certainly knew 
how to do so explicitly, as evidenced by new state constitutions also framed 
around the time. For example, the Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 
1682, one of the “most influential of the Colonial documents protecting in-
dividual rights,” provided that “in all courts[,] all persons of all persuasions 
may freely appear in their own way, and according to their own manner, and 
there personally plead their own cause themselves.”156 Several state consti-
tutions also specifically guaranteed a defendant “the right to be heard by 
himself” as well as through his counsel.157 
No such reference is found in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
including the Sixth Amendment’s provision protecting right to counsel and 
other adversarial process rights. Of course, the fact that the right to self-
                                                                                                                           
 150  DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 195–02 (1958); 
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 103, at 9–10; CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4–
8 (1911); Robert F. Boden, The Colonial Bar and the American Revolution, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1976). 
 151 Boden, supra note 150, at 2. 
 152 See BEANEY, supra note 127, at 13–18; supra notes 127–133 and accompanying text (dis-
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 153 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 103, at 9–10; Boden, supra note 150, at 3. 
 154 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64–66 (1932) (discussing the history of the right to 
counsel); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 155 See generally People v. Sharp, 499 P.2d 489, 492–96 (Cal. 1972) (providing a historical 
analysis of the access to and use of counsel), overruled by Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833–34. 
 156 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 130 (1971); 
see PA. FRAME OF GOV’T art. VI (1682). 
 157 E.g., DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (ratified 1792); GA. CONST. art. LVIII (ratified 1777); MASS. 
CONST. art. XII (ratified 1780); N.H. CONST. art. XV (ratified 1783); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX. 
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represent is nowhere in the Sixth Amendment does not mean the Framers did 
not think it was a good idea. Clearly some did—the right was explicitly guar-
anteed by federal law signed the day before the Sixth Amendment was pro-
posed, showing again that the Framers explicitly guaranteed self-representa-
tion when they meant to do so.158 Still, the concise and elegant Constitution 
and Bill of Rights is not a massive index of every good idea. Legislation and 
individual state constitutions can promulgate good ideas without putting the 
nation into a constitutional straitjacket. The absence of a right to self-
representation in the Sixth Amendment indicates that the decision to grant or 
deny defendants this right was left in the hands of the political branches and 
state governments. 
It is not surprising, then, that the most celebrated and cited Sixth 
Amendment cases have been about people needing and wanting counsel—
not the odd bird who declines the benefit people have fought so hard to ob-
tain.159 Clarence Gideon, of the 1963 Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wain-
wright, and the Scottsboro Boys, of the 1932 Supreme Court case Powell v. 
Alabama, have been memorialized in movies, documentaries, and popular 
books.160 In contrast to this pantheon, Faretta’s Anthony Faretta seems to 
present a mildly peculiar and perhaps rather anomalous case.161 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93 (“[I]n all the courts of the United 
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 160 See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) (popular book by Pulitzer Prize-
winning author); CLARENCE NORRIS & SYBIL D. WASHINGTON, THE LAST OF THE SCOTTSBORO 
BOYS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1979) (surviving defendant account); GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Hall-
mark 1980) (starring Henry Fonda as Gideon); Scottsboro: An American Tragedy (PBS television 
broadcast 2000) (winner of a daytime Emmy and nominated for an Oscar Award). 
 161  Cf. 422 U.S. at 807–08. A closer look at the Faretta case highlights its peculiarity. 
Charged with grand theft, Faretta wanted to represent himself rather than use the Los Angeles 
County public defender assigned to him. Id. He told the judge that he had represented himself 
before in a criminal case and had then secured a plea bargain. See Respondent’s Brief, Faretta, 
422 U.S. 806 (No. 73-5772), 1974 WL 174862, at *6. The judge in Faretta’s case was well aware 
of the problems of self-representation, explaining that in his experience, self-representing defend-
ants become “bogged down in making motions” to the point that they “completely neglect the 
problem of trying the lawsuit.” See id. at *7. He warned Faretta, “I have seen more people who 
represent themselves convict themselves, where if they just sat down and let somebody who knew 
what they were doing do it, could well have won it.” Id. Faretta still wanted to self-represent, and 
800 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:775 
In Faretta, the Court acknowledged that self-representation is “not 
stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many words.” 162  Nonetheless—
though it was “not an easy question” —the Court ultimately reversed the 
state court and constitutionalized the right of self-representation. 163  The 
Court was persuaded by the widespread popularity of the right—reflected in 
state constitutions, federal statutory law, circuit court decisions, and past 
dicta of the Court seeming to assume there was such a privilege.164 The 
Court also read the history of the widespread practice of self-representation 
as evidence that self-representation was a default right, with the right to 
counsel being merely “an ‘assistance’ for the accused, to be used at his op-
tion, in defending himself.”165 
The Court constitutionalized the right to self-representation, making it 
rigidly applicable to every state, out of “respect for the individual” and “to 
affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused.”166 This judicial policy 
choice might be defensible as long as it is just the defendant who “will bear 
the personal consequences of a conviction.”167 It may even be defensible 
despite the costs of disruption and delay that judges and court personnel 
                                                                                                                           
the judge preliminarily accepted his waiver of the right to counsel while reserving the ability to 
further evaluate whether Faretta was capable of effective self-representation. Id. at *7–8. 
 Several weeks later, the judge quizzed Faretta, who showed a remarkably good grasp of com-
plicated concepts such as hearsay and voir dire, but was stumped by tough questions about the 
number of exceptions to the hearsay rule and what specific code section governed challenges to 
jurors for cause. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 810–11. After the quiz, the trial judge noted for the record 
that there was no right to self-represent under California law, found that Faretta had not knowingly 
and validly waived his right to counsel, and appointed a public defender. Id. The California Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision because it had already ruled that there was no right to self-
represent under the state or federal constitutions. Sharp, 499 P.2d at 491–93. 
 162 422 U.S. at 819. 
 163 Id. at 806. 
 164 Id. at 812–17 (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012)) (“In all courts of the United 
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally . . . .”); Price v. Johnston, 334 
U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (rejecting the argument that the defendant has an absolute right to argue his 
own appeal, but contrasting this with the “recognized privilege of conducting his own defense at 
the trial”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (holding that the defendant has a 
Confrontation Clause right to be present at stages of proceedings where fundamental fairness 
requires his presence, noting that “defense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to be 
present at the examination of jurors or the summing up of counsel, for it will be in his power, if 
present, to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the 
trial himself”). See generally supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text (referencing pertinent 
state constitutions). 
 165 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832. 
 166 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984) (dignity and autonomy); Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 834 (respect). 
 167 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. 
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have borne.168 But those interests must be balanced against defendants who 
leverage this right to bludgeon and intimidate victims.169 
Not only is the constitutionalized right to self-representation an a-
textual embarrassment, it has also impeded and chilled judges and legisla-
tures from acting to redress these harms.170 For example, legislation that 
may have spared D.G. from the brutality of having to be interrogated by the 
man who raped her as a child twice faltered on fears of unconstitutionali-
ty. 171  The legislation would authorize courts to restrict self-representing 
defendants from directly interrogating victims of certain sex offenses on the 
stand.172 Instead, it would allow courts to appoint counsel to pose the de-
fendant’s questions if the court “finds by substantial evidence . . . that re-
quiring the victim to be questioned directly by the defendant will cause the 
victim to suffer serious emotional or mental distress that will prevent the 
victim from reasonably communicating at the trial.”173 
The goal of this bill was to balance confrontation rights with the state’s 
“compelling interest in the physical and psychological well-being of victims 
of sex offenses.”174 Unfortunately, however, the legislation remains stalled. 
Impeding concerns include a perceived conflict with the right to self-
represent and confront accusers and the lack of a “court case which has 
sanctioned the Legislature instructing a court how to proceed in these types 
of situations.”175 Doubt and confusion over potential constitutional conflict 
have thus chilled attempts to avert the harms that D.G. and other victims 
have experienced.176 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 144, at 59–60, 121 (reporting problems borne by 
courts). 
 169 See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text (discussing one particularly tragic tale of 
legislative inaction leading to an attempted suicide); supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text 
(elaborating on defendants’ abuse of certain constitutional rights). 
 170  See supra notes 139–169 and accompanying text (discussing paradigmatic concerns 
prompting the evolution of the rights to confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel); infra 
notes 171–213 and accompanying text (same); infra note 214 (collecting cases). 
 171 See, e.g., H. Comm. Judiciary 2010-S.H.B. 2457, supra note 16, at 2–3 (noting concern 
that a bill protecting rape victims from direct examination by perpetrators might conflict with 
defendants’ rights to self-representation and confrontation); H. Comm. Judiciary 2010-H.B. 2457, 
supra note 16, at 2–3 (same); see also Wash. State Legislature, Public Hearing #2, supra note 16 
(providing archived webcasting regarding the proposed bill); Wash. State Legislature, Public 
Hearing #1, supra note 16 (same). As already discussed, just the thought of facing her assailant in 
court prompted D.G. to attempt suicide. See Sullivan, supra note 12. See generally supra notes 
11–16 (discussing D.G.’s story). 
 172 S.H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (Wash. 2010). 
 173 Id. § 2(2)(c). 
 174 Id. § 1(3). 
 175 S. Comm. Judiciary 2010-S.H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., at 3 (Wash. 2010). 
 176 Compare Christine Clarridge, Rape Victim Empathizes with Woman Who Fled from Testi-
fying, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010, 9:16 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/201338
1490_rapevictim09m.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SW7W-TR8F (detailing harms by victim 
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B. Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Tyranny of Absolutism 
The right to face one’s accuser, as provided by the Confrontation 
Clause, is a powerful confederate in providing cover for intimidation tactics 
and casting constitutional doubt over attempts to protect victims. The hard-
ening of Confrontation Clause cases in recent decades has created an air of 
hypertechnical and complicated absolutism that adds murk to whether 
courts and legislatures may balance harms to victims with defendant pre-
rogatives.177 Though a powerful sword for defendants today, the Confronta-
tion Clause did not have much independent import until it was made appli-
cable to the states in 1965.178 And for decades after, Confrontation Clause 
rights were generally conflated with the rules of ordinary hearsay doctrine, 
drawing influential critique from scholars.179 
In recent years, the pendulum has swung sharply in an overcorrection 
that has cast doubt on attempts to protect vulnerable victims. The Confron-
tation Clause today covers far more than the “particular abuse common in 
16th- and 17th-century England [of] prosecuting a defendant through the 
presentation of ex parte affidavits.”180 The scope of coverage has widened, 
and the mandate has hardened. In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington, the Su-
preme Court rejected its former rule that an unavailable witness’s out-of-
court statement may be admitted as long as it has sufficient indicia of relia-
                                                                                                                           
who endured questioning by self-representing rapist), supra notes 139–175 and accompanying text 
(discussing paradigmatic concerns prompting the evolution of the rights to confrontation, compul-
sory process, and counsel), infra notes 177–213 and accompanying text (same), and Newcomb, 
supra note 90 (discussing self-representing defendant’s request to force child molestation victims 
to view videotapes of his sexual acts with them), with supra notes 171–175 and accompanying 
text (describing a failed Washington bill designed to restrict self-representing defendants from 
directly interrogating victims of certain sex offenses on the stand). 
 177 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 25, at 859–64, 871, 873–74 (discussing how the hardening 
Confrontation Clause cases have exacerbated confusion and harm to victims and heightened the 
incentives of batterers to intimidate victims into silence); Myrna S. Raeder, Being Heard After 
Giles: Comments on The Sound of Silence, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 105, 115 (2009), http://
www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Raeder-87-TLRSA-105.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
MK5A-9EHK (discussing problems with seeming constitutional absolutism in Confrontation 
Clause cases). 
 178 Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation Clause 
applies to the states because of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 179 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011, 1013–15 (1998) (arguing for a Confrontation Clause that is both less extensive and more 
intensive in its coverage). But see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 124–47 (1997) (arguing for a more narrowly tailored Confrontation Clause doctrine); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 (1998) (same). 
 180 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (observing this historical abuse); infra notes 
181–213 and accompanying text (illustrating the expansion of the Confrontation Clause). 
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bility.181 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia created a bright-
line bar against the admission of “testimonial” statements unless the de-
fendant had the prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.182 Despite 
this change in approach, identifying Confrontation Clause violations re-
mains a murky endeavor because determining what qualifies as “testimoni-
al” has spawned a convoluted, hypertechnical series of cases.183 
To further complicate matters, the Supreme Court in 2008 in Giles v. 
California controversially cut back the widely recognized doctrine of forfei-
ture by wrongdoing.184 This doctrine holds that defendants cannot render 
witnesses unavailable—for example, by murdering them—and then argue 
that their prior statements must be excluded because they are unavailable 
for cross-examination.185 In Giles, the defendant murdered his ex-girlfriend 
Brenda Avie by shooting her three times outside his grandmother’s house.186 
He claimed self-defense—though Avie was unarmed—and tried to portray 
her as jealous and unstable.187 At trial, prosecutors introduced testimony 
that three weeks before Giles killed her, Avie had called the police crying 
and explained that Giles had accused her of cheating on him, punched her in 
the face and head, brandished a knife, and threatened to kill her if he caught 
her cheating on him.188 Giles argued that admitting these statements violat-
                                                                                                                           
 181 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). Under the Court’s prior approach, reliability could be established 
by showing “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” or that the statement fell within a “firm-
ly rooted hearsay exception.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 
541 U.S. 36. 
 182 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55–56. 
 183 For example, hidden problems lurk in even mundane things such as lab reports stating the 
identity of a controlled substance or a blood alcohol level. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. 
Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011) (requiring the analyst who made the blood-alcohol determination to testify 
and not a surrogate familiar with the lab testing procedures); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
557 U.S. 305, 318–25 (2009) (upending the longstanding practice of sworn notarized reports re-
laying laboratory findings on the identity of substances tested and requiring lab technicians to 
personally testify on this routine matter). But see, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228–
30, 2241–42 (2012) (plurality opinion) (fracturing and holding that an expert may opine about a 
DNA match based on a comparison of vaginal swabs taken by another lab, and concluding that a 
DNA report produced before any suspect was identified is not testimonial). Even the use of court 
reporter transcripts of prior testimony may be jeopardized by Crawford’s shift in emphasis. See 
Peter Nicolas, But What If the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden Declarants 
Found in Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1149, 1155–68. 
 184 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008). 
 185 See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting under the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing the defendant’s argument that statements of an informant he 
killed could not be used because he killed her and thus she was unavailable for cross-examination); 
State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 529–33 (Wis. 2007) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that his wife’s 
prior voicemail messages and letters about his plan to kill her could not be admitted since she was 
unavailable to testify because he succeeded in killing her). 
 186 554 U.S. at 356. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 357. 
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ed his Confrontation Clause rights because he could not cross-examine Avie 
at trial because she was dead and, thus, unavailable to testify.189 
Writing for a majority in Giles, Justice Scalia reversed the conviction, 
refusing to recognize the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as it was then 
widely applied. Instead he required an additional showing that the defend-
ant “intended to prevent a witness from testifying” as well as rendered her 
unavailable to testify.190 Another baroque extreme in the fetishization of 
confrontation, Giles essentially forces the criminal justice system to bear 
the expense and delay of a mini-trial on the defendant’s intent in rendering a 
witness unavailable to testify.191 Perhaps better pragmatically attuned to the 
folly and waste of such an outcome, both Justices Samuel Alito and Clar-
ence Thomas separately concurred to offer prosecutors an alternative 
route—arguing that prior statements of domestic abuse victims to police are 
not testimonial because they are not formalized communications nor state-
ments constructed in order to evade the Confrontation Clause.192 
Confrontation cases have become so convoluted that Justice Thomas—
formerly a co-adventurer in Justice Scalia’s confrontation doctrine revolu-
tion—has expressed concern. 193 In Davis v. Washington, Justice Thomas 
wrote that “the Court’s standard is not only disconnected from history and 
unnecessary to prevent abuse; it also yields no predictable results to police 
officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law.”194 
In this highly unstable and convoluted domain, past important cases 
that have not been officially overruled now bear the stigma of doubt. For 
example, the murk has enshrouded the Court’s pre-Crawford decision in the 
1990 case Maryland v. Craig.195 By providing for testimony through closed-
                                                                                                                           
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 361, 368, 372, 375. Accordingly, the Court vacated the conviction and remanded for 
a determination of intent. Id. at 377. 
 191 Although expressly ruling in the domestic violence context, Giles’s newfound intent re-
quirement may similarly limit the protections afforded to victim-witnesses in the context of vio-
lent criminal conspiracies. Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: 
Whether a Co-Conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 
14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 285, 315–18 (2011) (concluding that the intent require-
ment imposed by Giles limits the applicability of forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in the co-
conspirator context). But see Nathaniel Koslof, Note, Cherry Still On Top: How Pinkerton Con-
cepts Continue to Govern Co-conspirator Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles, 55 B.C. 
L. REV. 301, 307–27 (2014) (arguing that the Cherry doctrine—which provides for expansive 
forfeiture by wrongdoing in the co-conspirator context—remains viable despite the newfound 
intent requirement imposed by Giles). 
 192 Giles, 554 U.S. at 377–78 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 193 Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 (Thomas, J., joining majority), with Davis v. Washing-
ton, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 194 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 195 See infra notes 196–216 and accompanying text. 
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circuit television, Craig is a crucial imprimatur for federal and state laws 
that authorize carefully calibrated protections for victims at risk for retrau-
matization.196 The procedure permits the defendant or his counsel to face 
and cross-examine the victim-witness on the screen, but spares the victim-
witness from being forced to appear physically before the perpetrator in a 
highly stressful environment.197 
Craig rendered more humane the Court’s balance between confronta-
tion and the need to protect victims from further harm. Just two years be-
fore, in Coy v. Iowa, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, invalidated 
an Iowa law allowing sexual assault victims—in Coy’s case, the two thir-
teen-year-old girls he sexually assaulted—to testify behind a screen.198 Coy 
invalidated the procedure because the screen protected the young victims 
from having to see their assailant again.199 In the Court’s view, besides con-
ferring the right to cross-examine witnesses, the Confrontation Clause also 
gives defendants the right to physically face those who testify against 
them—and to force those witnesses to face them.200 Nevertheless, Coy left 
open the possibility that states may protect vulnerable witnesses if there 
were individualized findings of special need for protection.201 
That’s exactly what happened in Craig; the trial court made individual-
ized findings of special need to protect six-year-old girls who were sexually 
abused by the defendant.202 Accordingly, the children were permitted to tes-
tify in a closed-circuit television procedure in which the child-witness, 
prosecutor, and defense counsel were in a separate room while the jury, de-
fendant, and judge remained in the courtroom.203 The jury and defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Cf. 497 U.S. 836, 851–57 (1990). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b) (2012) (providing for 
closed-circuit television testimony by certain vulnerable witnesses); UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TES-
TIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT §§ 4–8 (2002) (providing a uniform code on alternative 
procedures for vulnerable child witnesses); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1357 (West 2004) (prescribing 
procedures for contemporaneous examination and cross-examination by closed-circuit television); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (2013) (prescribing procedures for videotape depositions to be 
admitted if “the court finds that further testimony would cause the victim emotional trauma so that 
the victim is medically unavailable or otherwise unavailable”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (2013) 
(prescribing procedures for children to testify by two-way closed-circuit television); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/106B-5 (2013) (prescribing procedures allowing vulnerable child or disabled per-
sons to testify by closed-circuit television). 
 197 Craig, 497 U.S. at 851–57 (explaining the testimony by closed-circuit television procedure 
and discussing the Court’s important interest in protecting vulnerable victim-witnesses from fur-
ther traumatic injury). 
 198 487 U.S. 1012, 1014–15 (1988). 
 199 Id. at 1020. 
 200 Id. at 1018–20. 
 201 Id. at 1021–22. 
 202 497 U.S. at 842. 
 203 Id. at 841. 
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could watch the child witness by one-way closed-circuit television, but the 
child was not forced to see the perpetrator who sexually abused her.204 
Upholding the procedure over Justice Scalia’s dissent,205 Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor—writing for the majority—underscored that the Con-
frontation Clause does not confer to defendants “the absolute right to a face-
to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial.”206 Instead, she ex-
plained that the adversarial procedure may be adjusted when “necessary to 
further an important public policy.”207 The Court in Craig concluded that “a 
State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse 
victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a 
defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.”208 
After Justice Scalia’s massive shake-up of Confrontation Clause doc-
trine in Crawford, the continued viability of Craig—and thus the ability of 
courts and state legislatures to protect victims—is unclear.209 When Craig 
was decided, the framework for confrontation analysis was the more flexi-
ble approach of Ohio v. Roberts, which Crawford disrupted.210 For now, 
though, most courts that have considered the question have continued to 
follow Craig because the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled its 
precedent.211 Moreover, there is a strong argument that Craig remains good 
law because it is sound and compatible with Crawford: whereas “Crawford 
addresses the question of when confrontation is required; Craig addresses 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court’s failure “to sustain a categorical 
guarantee of the Constitution”). 
 206 Id. at 844 (majority opinion). 
 207 Id. at 845. 
 208 Id. at 853. 
 209 See, e.g., Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 511 n.178 
(2006) (“It is unclear whether Maryland v. Craig survives Crawford.”); Myrna S. Raeder, Com-
ments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, 
Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1015 (2007) (arguing that Craig should survive 
after Crawford); David M. Wagner, The End of the “Virtually Constitutional”? The Confrontation 
Right and Crawford v. Washington as a Prelude to Reversal of Maryland v. Craig, 19 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 469, 473 (2007) (“There are several holdings in Crawford that throw the continuing valid-
ity of Maryland v. Craig into grave doubt.”). 
 210 See People v. Phillips, 315 P.3d 136, 151 (Colo. App. 2012) (noting that “[b]ecause much 
of Craig was based on the reliability test in Ohio v. Roberts,” defendants may plausibly argue 
Craig is no longer valid—but ultimately declining to so rule unless and until the Court “explicitly 
overrules its own precedent”). See generally Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (providing for a reliability 
test that allowed admission of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement as long as it had 
sufficient indicia of reliability). 
 211 See, e.g., Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are not at liberty 
to presume that Craig has been overruled sub silentio.”); United States v. Sapse, No. 2:10-CR-
00370-KJD, 2012 WL 5334630, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2012) (“While the Supreme Court may 
revisit Craig, this Court is bound to follow directly applicable Supreme Court precedent until it is 
clearly overruled.”); Phillips, 315 P.3d at 151 (collecting cases). 
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the question of what procedures confrontation requires.” 212  As Richard 
Friedman observes, however, although Crawford doesn’t overtly undermine 
the holding in Craig, Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion is more consistent 
with his dissent in Craig. 213 If Craig is eliminated, however, the Court 
would entrench the Confrontation Clause as a dangerous weapon for wit-
ness intimidation by defendants. 
III. TWO PATHS THROUGH THE MORASS 
Courts and legislatures seeking to protect victims of serious violent 
crime and sexual assault from further attack by defendants during adversar-
ial adjudication face a quandary. The very unstable constitutional terrain 
that gives defendants cover to pursue intimidation and retaliation tactics 
also imperils protective measures.214 If adapted procedures are subsequently 
deemed unconstitutional, then, perversely, their use may expose victims to 
even greater harm. A post-conviction reversal forces vulnerable victim-
witnesses to endure not only the crushing disappointment of a vacated con-
viction, but also another round of harmful adversarial adjudication.215 
This brutal dilemma, however, should not deter protection and innova-
tion. First, this Part discusses how practices that reduce the traumatic toll 
for justice (the “mid-range solution”) can and should withstand constitu-
tional challenge.216 Second, this Part explores a farther-reaching approach 
that offers victims and defendants the opportunity to opt out of the harms 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 439, 454 (2004); see also Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 335 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2011) (quoting Andrew W. Eichner, Note, Preserving Innocence: Protecting Child Victims 
in the Post-Crawford Legal System, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 101, 115 (2010) (quoting Friedman, supra, 
at 454)). 
 213 Friedman, supra note 212, at 454. 
 214 Cf., e.g., State v. Folk, 256 P.3d 735, 744–47 (Idaho 2011) (reversing a conviction for 
lewd conduct on a child because of the utilization of certain protective measures, including closed-
circuit camera testimony and prohibiting the defendant from directly interrogating the child—
instead requiring the use of standby counsel); Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 570 N.E.2d 1384, 
1389–91 (Mass. 1991) (reversing an indecent assault on a child conviction because of the judge’s 
protective measure of having standby counsel question the victim instead of the defendant out of 
concern that the defendant was trying to intimidate the victim); Commonwealth v. Spear, 686 
N.E.2d 1037, 1042–43 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (reversing a conviction because of a protective 
measure for the child-victim that allowed the child to testify facing the jury with either side profile 
or back to the defendant); S. Comm. Judiciary 2010-S.H.B. 2457, supra note 175, at 3 (reporting 
constitutional concerns surrounding a bill designed to protect sexual assault victims from interro-
gation by defendants). 
 215 See, e.g., Folk, 256 P.3d at 750 (remanding for further proceedings); Conefrey, 570 N.E.2d 
at 1390–91 (remanding for a new trial); Spear, 686 N.E.2d at 1045 (setting aside the guilty ver-
dicts and reversing the judgments). 
 216 See infra notes 220–257 and accompanying text. 
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and risks of adversarial adjudication altogether. 217 The mid-range solution 
is designed to prevent some of the worst harms and misuses of the adversar-
ial process by clarifying the constitutional murk and establishing best prac-
tices for minimizing witness retraumatization.218 The farther-reaching ap-
proach goes beyond adversarial adjudication to offer victims and defendants 
an opt-out from the costs of traditional adversarial adjudication and another 
avenue toward justice.219 
A. Against Absolutism: Defending Protective Measures 
The basic problem chilling judicial and legislative attempts to protect 
victims is mistaken absolutism in regards to adversarial rights. The applica-
bility of defendant confrontation, self-representation, or discovery rights is 
not an automatic stop sign for victim protection measures. It is important to 
distinguish the threshold question of whether confrontation, self-representa-
tion, or discovery rights apply in a situation from the separate question of 
what is required if the rights do apply.220 Constitutional rights—even vener-
ated rights at the cornerstone of a free society, such as First Amendment 
freedoms—are not absolute such that if they apply they must prevail.221 
Thus, asserting that a defendant has adversarial process rights in a situation 
does not end the inquiry because these rights are correspondingly not abso-
                                                                                                                           
 217 See infra notes 258–295 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 220–257 and accompanying text. 
 219 See William Schma et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Using the Law to Improve the Pub-
lic’s Health, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 60–61 (2005) (emphasizing the benefits of therapeutic 
justice and the need for changes to the current criminal justice system to reduce jurigenic harm to 
victims); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, in LAW 
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 763, 767 (David B. 
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) (discussing various dilemmas faced by the therapeutic 
justice movement, but concluding that a measured interdisciplinary approach to law would serve 
public interest). But see Bill Buzenberg, Commentary, A Litany of Barriers . . . A Culture of Se-
crecy, in SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: A FRUSTRATING SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 8 (Gordon 
Witkin & David Donald eds., 2010), http://cloudfront-files-1.publicintegrity.org/documents/pdfs/
Sexual%20Assault%20on%20Campus.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z5E3-UGJB (arguing that 
“closed, school-run proceedings” offered by many colleges and universities fail to provide an 
adequate alternative avenue towards justice). 
 220 See Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 335 n.17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (distinguishing 
between the different issues of whether the Confrontation Clause applies to a situation and what is 
required if the rights do apply (quoting Friedman, supra note 212, at 454)). 
 221  See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth 
Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak 
whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he 
chooses.”); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (“At the outset we reject the view that 
freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 
‘absolutes . . . .’”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 995 (1987) (“The Court and commentators routinely remind us that constitutional rights 
and provisions are not absolutes.”). 
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lute. Indeed, especially in criminal procedure, “interest balancing takes cen-
ter stage.”222 
So, what is required? A crucial yet overlooked point is the distinction 
between crimes against the sovereign—the paradigmatic core context for 
strong adversarial process rights—and crimes against victims. As already 
elucidated, adversarial rights emerged to address the risk of abuse in prose-
cutions for crimes against the sovereign.223 Adversarial protections for de-
fendants should therefore be at the zenith in the core context of prosecutions 
for crimes against the State while less restrictive—and thus better able to 
address countervailing needs—outside this core context. The heightened 
adversarial process requirements in the core category of cases should not be 
mechanically transposed in full rigidity and demanding restrictions to cases 
outside the paradigmatic category. 
Constitutional criminal procedural rights for defendants are frequently 
limited and counterbalanced with societal interests in preventing harm, fa-
cilitating effective law enforcement, and ensuring that systemic costs are 
manageable.224 Criminal rights doctrine openly discusses policy concerns, 
which influence decisions about both whether a constitutional protection 
applies and the breadth of governmental power to protect important societal 
interests if the right indeed applies. For example, the Court has acknowl-
edged that concerns about overburdening states with costs have influenced 
its interpretation of the scope of the right to counsel for the indigent.225 Alt-
hough this is an example of policy influence on whether a right applies, 
there are myriad examples of policy influence on the ambit of governmental 
power to protect societal interests even if a right applies. 
Indeed, the default Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant for 
searches and seizures is riddled with exceptions because of policy concerns, 
such as the societal need for effective law enforcement and special safety 
concerns.226 For example, Fourth Amendment protections are strongest in 
                                                                                                                           
 222 Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1337, 1350 (2002). 
 223 See supra notes 102–138 and accompanying text. 
 224 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking ‘Effective Remedies’: Remedial Deterrence in Interna-
tional Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 759–60 (2008) (citing as examples how “the rights to bail, 
appointed counsel, and ‘equality of arms’ . . . are limited in ways that accommodate the public’s 
legitimate interest in punishing and deterring crime as well as other interests, such as keeping the 
justice system operating at reasonable expense”). 
 225 See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (refusing to extend the right to 
counsel for the indigent to cases involving sanctions or threat of imprisonment because this would 
“create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse 
states”). 
 226 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1473–74 (1985) (listing at least twenty exceptions to the requirement of a warrant); Christo-
pher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18–28 (1991) (dis-
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the home, forming the heart of privacy protections against the state.227 In 
contrast, Fourth Amendment protections are less rigid and more flexible 
when applied outside the home, such as in automobiles.228 The rights still 
apply, but they do not apply in full force and rigidity, allowing more flexi-
ble balancing alongside other important social considerations.229 These ex-
ceptions are the result of the Court’s express recognition of important coun-
terbalancing policy concerns, not just a reflection of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s perceived lower position in the hierarchy of judicial protections for 
constitutional criminal procedural rights.230 
Even First Amendment law, which enjoys a privileged position in the 
constitutional hierarchy, distinguishes between the core zone of protected 
speech—where safeguards are at their height—and the periphery. 231 The 
First Amendment strongly safeguards political speech from regulation while 
                                                                                                                           
cussing the various exceptions to the warrant requirement); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, 
Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 580–89 (1992) (discuss-
ing policy balancing against defendant constitutional rights). 
 227 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (explaining that the home is at 
the Fourth Amendment’s “very core” and “first among equals”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 31 (2001) (reiterating that the home is at the core of Fourth Amendment protections); Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“[T]he ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” (quoting United States v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))). 
 228 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302–03 (1999) (discussing the reduced 
expectation of privacy in cars); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (recogniz-
ing that “the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that 
relating to one’s home or office”); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (“[F]or the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.”). 
 229 See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74–75 & n.7 (2001) (tracing the 
genealogy of “special needs” cases where the Court has permitted flexible balancing of Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests and other important societal concerns); Cynthia Lee, Package 
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About 
the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1427–65 (2010) (discussing re-
duced privacy protections for containers because of a myriad of countervailing societal interests). 
 230 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 226, at 580–89. For discussions of the Supreme Court’s seemingly 
implicit hierarchical ordering of constitutional criminal procedural protections in order of protec-
tion, see, for example, Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Priva-
cy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253, 305 (2006); Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court’s 
Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 478–83 (1985). 
 231 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673 (2011) (Breyer J., dissenting) 
(“[T]his Court has distinguished for First Amendment purposes among different contexts in which 
speech takes place.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (observing that the Supreme Court’s “First Amendment decisions have cre-
ated a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech” and that “[c]ore political speech 
occupies the highest, most protected position”); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420–21 (1988) 
(distinguishing limitations on core political speech). 
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imposing less restrictive constraints on regulating other forms of speech, 
such as commercial speech or the speech of government employees.232 
Sixth Amendment rights are also not absolute. Take, for example, the 
right of self-representation inferred from the Sixth Amendment.233 The State 
retains power to protect important policy interests even if this means limit-
ing—or even terminating—the right to self-represent. 234  For example, 
courts may require defendants to make a timely as well as a voluntary and 
intelligent election to self-represent themselves.235 In addition, a court may 
choose to appoint standby counsel to help the defendant even over a de-
fendant’s objection.236 This court-appointed standby counsel may assist in 
the defense even without the self-representing defendant’s express consent 
as long as the appearance of self-representation before the jury is not “seri-
ously undermined.”237 Finally, if a defendant engages in “serious and ob-
structionist misconduct,” trial courts have discretion to terminate self-repre-
sentation altogether.238 
Likewise, the right to face one’s accuser—provided by the Confronta-
tion Clause—is also not absolute. For example, disruptive defendants can 
be removed from the courtroom—and thus rendered unable to face witness-
es or be present for trial—in the interest of courtroom decorum.239 Even 
Justice Scalia, the lead proponent of the Court’s Confrontation Clause revo-
lution, wrote that exceptions to the core confrontation right might exist if 
“necessary to further an important public policy.”240 He seemed to diverge 
from this position in his furious Maryland v. Craig dissent, which was 
clearly colored by his frustration over the particular facts of the case.241 
Time—and the responsibilities of being a leader in a successful Confronta-
tion Clause revolution—may have returned Justice Scalia to consistency 
with his prior caveat. Despite unabashed and vigorous overruling of other 
long-settled cases, nowhere did Crawford or its progeny disturb Craig’s 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the core of what the First Amendment is de-
signed to protect.’” (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003))). 
 233 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 & n.46, 835 (1975) (constitutionalizing this right). 
 234 Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 & n.46, 835. 
 237 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187 (1984). 
 238 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 & n.46, 835; accord Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162. 
 239 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
 240 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988). 
 241 Cf. 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia opened his dissent by 
vividly decrying that a young daughter in the exclusive custody of an estranged wife for several 
months may accuse a father of sexual abuse and testify against him without having to be in the 
same room looking at him. Id. 
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holding.242 Justice Scalia’s statement that even core Confrontation Clause 
rights may yield if “necessary to further an important public policy” also 
still stands.243 
Courts and legislatures seeking to protect victims thus should not quail 
in concern whenever a remedy may raise Confrontation Clause, self-rep-
resentation, or other constitutional issues. Rather, it is important to make a 
record regarding the need for the protective measures that justify adaptation 
of adversarial procedures. The findings that must be made before pursuing a 
protective measure depend on the constitutional provision implicated. To 
follow the originalist framework of Justice Scalia, the ambit of power to 
protect will depend on whether the right is an implied atextual extension—
like the right to self-represent—or an explicitly specified core right, like 
confrontation.244 
Thus, for example, courts and legislatures should proceed with caution 
on the use of protective measures that remove the testifying witness to an-
other room. Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause cases explain that face-to-
face confrontation is a core constitutional right. 245  Even under Justice 
O’Connor’s pre-Crawford victim protection case of Craig, there must be 
individualized findings of special need in the particular victim’s case to 
warrant curtailing the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right.246 
Where possible and sufficient to protect a victim in need of special 
safeguards, it would be wiser to use a two-way closed-circuit television 
procedure rather than the one-way closed-circuit television procedure used 
in Craig. In the two-way system, the victim can see the perpetrator and the 
perpetrator can see the victim. Although courts are split on whether two-
way closed-circuit television testimony requires findings of special need or 
                                                                                                                           
 242 See, e.g., Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are not at liberty 
to presume that Craig has been overruled sub silentio.”); United States v. Sapse, No. 2:10-CR-
00370-KJD, 2012 WL 5334630, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2012) (observing that the court was still 
bound by Craig until “it is clearly overruled”); People v. Phillips, 315 P.3d 136, 151 (Colo. App. 
2012) (observing that the Supreme Court had not yet explicitly overruled Craig); Michael R. 
Dreeben, Prefatory Article: The Confrontation Clause, the Law of Unintended Consequences, and 
the Structure of Sixth Amendment Analysis, 34 GEO L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii, xxxii 
(2005) (“Craig, not Crawford, is in the mainstream of Sixth Amendment analysis.”); Friedman, 
supra note 212, at 454 (observing that “nothing in Crawford suggests that Craig is placed in 
doubt”). 
 243 See 487 U.S. at 1021. 
 244 See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 861–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between exten-
sions of the Sixth Amendment beyond its text and rights literally inscribed in the text); Coy, 487 
U.S. at 1021 (suggesting a distinction between protections for “implications of the Confrontation 
Clause, as opposed to its most literal application”). 
 245 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44–45; Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017. 
 246 497 U.S. at 844. 
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not,247 at least one court has recognized that because two-way closed-circuit 
television testimony preserves face-to-face confrontation—albeit via televi-
sion screens—there is no cutback on the confrontation right that would re-
quire special need.248 Regardless of whether or not this procedure is consti-
tutionally mandated, the two-way approach better preserves the ideal of 
confrontation and thus would be less vulnerable to attack. 
Where the conflicting defendant right is an implied atextual extension, 
such as the right to self-representation, then protections against victim harm 
should be more readily available. An important best practice is the ap-
pointment of standby counsel in cases of violent crime or sexual assault 
where the defendant insists on self-representation. This approach preserves 
the right to self-represent with a limited adaptation to protect victims of vio-
lent crimes and sexual assault. The defendant would still have the right to 
self-represent generally and to pose questions for standby counsel to ask the 
victim. Moreover, standby counsel should be appointed from the start so 
that the defense attorney is not put in the untenable position of having to 
prepare for a key witness without having been present for the whole case.249 
Fortunately, this practice already has gained traction; courts have generally 
upheld appointment of standby counsel to question victims in order to avoid 
having victims endure questioning from their alleged attacker.250 
                                                                                                                           
 247 Compare, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(requiring individualized findings of special need for two-way closed-circuit testimony), and 
United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 555 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that testimony through a 
two-way closed-circuit television system violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right be-
cause the victim-witness did not show a sufficient particularized fear of facing the defendant), 
with United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that because two-way 
television permits face-to-face confrontation, individualized findings of special need are not re-
quired for the procedure). 
 248 See Gigante, 155 F.3d at 81–82. 
 249 See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight 
Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 676, 684–87 (2000) (discussing concerns 
with effective representation by standby counsel given insufficient time and exposure to the case 
to prepare). 
 250 See, e.g., Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1034–36 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming the 
trial court’s refusal to allow the self-representing defendant to question children that he sexually 
abused as well as the decision to appoint an attorney to pose the questions that the defendant 
wished to ask); Applegate v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Ky. 2009) (“Even if a de-
fendant is granted the right to cross-examine witnesses, there is no constitutional right to personal-
ly cross-examine the victim of his crimes.”); Partin v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 23, 28–29 
(Ky. 2005) (approving the refusal to allow the self-representing defendant to personally cross-
examine his wife, twenty-year-old son, and other adult victims whom the defendant held at gun-
point). As discussed above, however, courts are mixed. See supra notes 166–176 and accompany-
ing text; see also Folk, 256 P.3d at 744–47 (reversing because the defendant was denied the op-
portunity to directly question the victim). 
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The protection is still not consistently applied, however, resulting in 
severe distress for unprotected victims.251 For consistent protection across 
courts, and to ensure that a victim is not exposed to harm because of an 
oversight in requests for protective measures, it would be wise for legisla-
tures to enact guidance for courts in such cases. For example, after contro-
versial incidents of victims suffering through cross-examination directly by 
their attackers, Washington legislators proposed the following guidance for 
courts in sex offense cases: 
When a defendant has waived his or her right to counsel and is 
representing himself or herself in a criminal trial, the court, on a 
motion by the prosecuting attorney . . . may restrict the defendant 
from directly questioning a victim and instead require that the de-
fendant question the victim through a court-appointed attorney.252 
Under this legislation, the trial court must find “by substantial evidence, . . . 
that requiring the victim to be questioned directly by the defendant will 
cause the victim to suffer serious emotional or mental distress that will pre-
vent the victim from reasonably communicating at the trial.”253 If the stand-
ard is not met, and the defendant cross-examines the victim, then the legis-
lation authorizes courts to pursue “reasonable procedures” such as “prohib-
iting the defendant from approaching the victim during the defendant’s 
questioning or ordering that the defendant remain seated the entire time the 
defendant is questioning the victim.”254 
In framing protections, it is important to avoid sexual assault or child 
exceptionalism. Victims of violent crime also undergo severe traumatic 
stress and may be in need of protection from further revictimization by the 
criminal process.255 Adults as well as children and men as well as women 
who have been violently attacked can all be at risk for retraumatization and 
require protection.256 Adult women and men do not shed their interests in 
                                                                                                                           
 251 Cf. Folk, 256 P.3d at 744–47; supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text (discussing one 
particularly tragic tale of legislative inaction leading to an attempted suicide). 
 252 S.H.B. 2457, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (Wash. 2010). 
 253 Id. § 2(2)(c). 
 254 Id. § 3(2). 
 255 See, e.g., Philippe Birmes et al., Peritraumatic Disassociation, Acute Stress, and Early 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Victims of General Crime, 46 CAN. J. PSYCHOL. 649, 650 (2001) 
(reporting findings on risk factors for PTSD after violent crime); Jonathan I. Bisson & Jonathan P. 
Shepherd, Psychological Reactions of Victims of Violent Crime, 167 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 718, 718–
19 (1995) (discussing findings regarding the adverse psychological impacts on victims of violent 
crime). 
 256 See, e.g., Brewin et al., supra note 41, at 506–07 (discussing findings in a study of men 
and women on the association between intense fear, helplessness, or horror at the time of traumat-
ic violent crime and PTSD symptoms). Admittedly, women may be more vulnerable to developing 
PTSD after violent crime than men, but both genders may be at risk depending on other back-
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protection nor vulnerabilities to severe psychological and physical harm 
from serious assault. Interest-linking across diversely impacted victim 
groups better ensures robust protections rather than detrimental exceptional-
ism for a particularly vulnerable group.257 
B. Opting Out: Beyond the Adversarial Process 
Although adversarial adjudication has long been the default in criminal 
procedure, it is not the only way. Recall that the procedures and constitu-
tional protections in adversarial adjudication were shaped by a history of 
concern with political prosecutions, such as seditious libel or treason, and 
the contest between the defendant and the state.258 When it comes to serious 
violent or sexual assault crimes, however, the adversarial contest is between 
the victim and the perpetrator rather than merely the defendant and the State 
as in political crimes. In the contest between the victim and perpetrator in 
adversarial adjudication, there is a gross inequality of rights and protections 
that pose the risk of further harm to the victim due to defendant tactics.259 
Rather than using adversarial procedures shaped by the legacies of 
prosecutions for a different type of crime, it would be salutary to have a 
system for achieving justice that takes into consideration victim protection 
as well as defendant interests. Such a model would incorporate public 
health insights about how to ameliorate further victim harm. This approach 
is not mere unrealized fantasy. Rather, it has been piloted for a subset of 
sexual assault crimes. Psychologist Mary Koss has pioneered and tested a 
groundbreaking model of resolving sexual assault cases that is victim-
centered and offers excellent incentives for defendants to consent to partici-
pation.260 The procedure involves restorative justice-style methods, such as 
a conference run by a convener who works with the perpetrator and victim 
to develop a redress plan.261 
The customary wisdom is that restorative justice procedures are useful 
for addressing minor or middling crimes, such as theft, but that they are ill-
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 260 Mary P. Koss et al., Expanding a Community’s Justice Response to Sex Crimes Through 
Advocacy, Prosecutorial, and Public Health Collaboration: Introducing the RESTORE Program, 
19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1435, 1436, 1439–45 (2004). 
 261 Id. at 1450–51. 
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suited for serious violent crimes or sexual assault crimes.262 The face-to-
face mediation-style meeting between perpetrator and victim typically asso-
ciated with restorative justice practices seems downright dangerous.263 Fur-
thermore, the use of informal mediation-style procedures and a softer-edged 
focus on reparations risks minimizing the crime, offering what one scholar 
powerfully termed “cheap justice,” and failing to properly denounce the 
violence.264 As a victim participant in one Nova Scotia program poignantly 
put it, “I think that by taking it out of the courtroom, [it’s saying] it’s not a 
crime, let’s deal with it in a nice way so that everyone is ‘happy.’”265 
Cognizant of these critiques, Koss and a collaborative team of public 
health experts, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and sexual assault 
advocates designed and adapted a pilot program for selected sex crimes.266 
Funded by the Centers for Disease Control as a violence prevention pro-
gram, the pilot program was named “RESTORE,” an abbreviation for Re-
sponsibility and Equity for Sexual Transgressions Offering a Restorative 
Experience.267 A secondary prevention strategy, the goal of RESTORE is to 
reduce the after-effects of harm that has already happened.268 Rather than 
adversarial adjudication, the RESTORE model provides procedures that 
take into consideration the interests of victims as well as the perpetrator—
termed the responsible party. 
Both the victim and the defendant must consent to the RESTORE pro-
cedure to get off the adversarial adjudication track. 269 For victims, RE-
STORE offers a confidential, less intimidating, and more supportive process 
to tell their story without interruption or distortion, to obtain an acknowl-
edgment of responsibility from the perpetrator, and to redress the harm 
                                                                                                                           
 262 See, e.g., Harry Mika et al., Listening to Victims—A Critique of Restorative Justice Policy 
and Practice in the United States, 68 FED. PROBATION 32, 34 (2004) (discussing concerns of 
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without forever being linked to the crime in public records.270 Victims also 
have the option of not being forced to appear before the defendant again by 
having a family member or friend read their impact statement at the RE-
STORE conference.271 Defendants also have excellent incentives to partici-
pate in RESTORE because the program delivers a powerful quadruple ben-
efit: successful participation and completion removes the risk of incarcera-
tion, sex offender registration, civil suit, and a criminal record.272 
RESTORE began accepting victims and perpetrators in 2003, but was 
limited to acquaintance rape and non-penetration sex crimes.273 Exclusion 
criteria included repeat offenders, sexual assaults that were part of a pattern 
of ongoing intimate partner violence, crimes using violence beyond uncon-
sented-to penetration, and persons under the age of eighteen.274 Potentially 
eligible cases were identified and referred by prosecutors before any crimi-
nal charges were brought.275 To enter the RESTORE program, the perpetra-
tor must acknowledge that the sexual act occurred and pay a sliding-scale 
fee that varies depending on ability to pay.276 In misdemeanor cases, the 
defendant must enter a guilty plea, though penalties are held in abeyance.277 
After intake and consent, there are three main stages to the RESTORE 
model of redress: (1) preparation for the RESTORE conference; (2) confer-
encing and redress plan generation; and (3) supervision, reparation, and re-
integration.278 During the preparation stage, the victim prepares an impact 
statement and the perpetrator prepares a statement of responsibility.279 The 
case manager works with the perpetrator to ensure that he or she does not 
gloss over the crime and works with the victim to “discourage ad hominem 
statements such as pervert, [or] scumbag” to avoid potentially dangerous or 
counterproductive shaming.280 The case manager also works with the par-
ties to begin developing a redress plan, which generally includes communi-
ty service, payment plans for reparations, treatment plans, and other protec-
tions, such as supervision and no-contact agreements.281 
The RESTORE conference is held at a police station for security and 
moderated by a trained facilitator.282 Protocols govern arrivals, room entry, 
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and seating arrangements—including the barrier of a conference table wide 
enough to preclude bodily contact and to shield the victim’s body from the 
perpetrator’s gaze.283 Typically, the offender makes a statement acknowledg-
ing the wrongful act.284 The victim then gives an impact statement and the 
responsible party will restate his or her understanding of what was said.285 
Thereafter, family and friends of the victim and perpetrator are given the op-
portunity to speak.286 Finally, the redress plan is finalized.287 
After the conference, the perpetrator is supervised by a professional 
case manager and overseen by a Community Accountability and Re-
Integration Board of community volunteers. 288 Supervision “represents a 
commitment to the [victim] of sexual assault to not retraumatize her with 
promises that are not kept,” and the community board helps ensure commu-
nity safety.289 The traditional criminal justice system operates as a back-up 
and incentive for success; if perpetrators fail to fulfill the rehabilitative and 
reparative requirements, those who committed a felony offense are liable 
for prosecution, and misdemeanants may be sentenced based on their guilty 
plea.290 
The early promise of the RESTORE approach has led to similar pilot 
programs in other jurisdictions, such as Auckland, New Zealand, which re-
ports promising results.291 The innovation is an important and inspiring first 
step, though limited to just a subset of sexual assault crimes.  
Considering traditional adversarial adjudication’s extensively-docu-
mented harms for victims, much more needs to be done in developing ap-
propriate alternatives.292 For more serious violent and sexual assault crimes, 
some of the sanctions taken off the table in RESTORE might need to re-
main an option, depending on the type of crime and the risk of recidivism. 
Other inducements, such as alternatives to incarceration or exemption from 
sex offender registration for certain offenses, could still offer sufficient in-
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centive to participate. There is wide room to innovate and build on the 
groundbreaking work of RESTORE. 
Further developing alternative adjudication procedures for a wider 
range of crimes involving at-risk victims may better provide redress while 
reducing the risk of further iatrogenic retraumitization. Studies indicate that 
seeking justice can be beneficial to the mental health of crime victims.293 
Participation in the criminal justice process can give a sense of empower-
ment that might be protective against the adverse mental health effects of 
suffering the crime in the first place—potentially mitigating PTSD symp-
toms.294 But enduring the intense stress and inequality in protections of ad-
versarial adjudication may cause victims more fear, anxiety, and depression 
than those who stay silent and forego justice.295 Simply put, our criminal 
justice system should not tolerate a process that deters victims from seeking 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Rights originally associated with the integrity of the adversarial pro-
cess have billowed beyond the historical reasons for their framing and even 
beyond their text. Thus, untethered from the customary markers for the 
metes and bounds of constitutional entitlements, the limits of adversarial 
rights have grown murky. The swamp of uncertainty is a perilous ground for 
victims and a fertile ground for defendants who seek to use intimidation 
tactics against their previously assaulted victims. 
Legislatures and courts are forced to proceed hesitantly in this uncer-
tain domain, lest protections for victims of traumatic assaults be deemed 
transgressions against the defendant’s asserted constitutional entitlements. 
The murk, however, should not chill protection and innovation. And this is 
particularly true when defendants’ rights are stretched beyond the core cate-
gory of cases for which they were initially forged. As elucidated in this Ar-
ticle, the paradigmatic cases prompting the emergence of adversarial pro-
cess rights involved prosecutions for crimes against the sovereign, where 
concerns about adversarial parity and protections are at their zenith. Outside 
this core category of crimes, restrictions can—and should—be less rigid to 
accommodate important countervailing concerns, as similarly reflected in 
First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Like other constitutional rights, 
adversarial procedural rights are not absolute.  
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, “in the administration of crimi-
nal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims.”296 The need to 
protect victims from the misuse of adversarial protections is an important 
value that can justify protective measures, such as appointing standby coun-
sel in lieu of permitting defendants to directly interrogate at-risk victims of 
traumatic crimes on the stand. Clarifying the murk of law to encourage 
wider use of victim-protective procedures is a mid-range solution to amelio-
rate some of the worst harms for the most vulnerable. A farther-ranging ap-
proach is to offer victims and defendants an opt-out from adversarial adju-
dication altogether. An alternative resolution system designed with serious 
crimes in mind and with consideration of public health insights about reduc-
ing secondary harms can help reduce the current traumatic costs of justice. 
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